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A fusion center is defined as a “collaborative effort of two or more agencies that 
provide resources, expertise and information to the center with the goal of maximizing 
their ability to detect, prevent, investigate and respond to criminal and terrorist activity” 
(Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a 
New Era.  U.S. Department of Justice & Department of Homeland Security, 2006).  As 
fusion centers proliferate nationally, privacy advocates and civil liberty groups continue 
to be concerned with the risks associated with consolidating and sharing information; 
authorities feel that the benefits outweigh the risks.  While fusion centers have incredible 
possibilities, there has to be vigilance to assure that the all-hazard, all-crime, counter-
terrorism activities undertaken at fusion centers do not compromise the Constitution.   
There have been numerous guidance documents developed by both the 
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice to assist states in 
developing policies and procedures that meet state and federal laws of ensuring the 
protection and privacy of citizens.  Some fusion centers are extremely open with their 
information practices and share their policies/procedures with the public, yet others do 
not.  This lack of consistency creates disparity among fusion centers as a whole, thus 
compounding the concerns. 
There is an apparent apprehension amongst many privacy advocates that the 
increased growth in fusion centers may impinge upon citizens’ civil rights, liberties and 
privacy.  Contributing to this issue is the public’s limited understanding of what the 
fusion process entails.  Privacy advocates fear that these centers may become the next 
iteration of centralized surveillance of citizens.  Privacy advocates and civil liberties 
groups have concerns with the consolidation of threat information processes may include 
information on individuals that impinge upon their Constitutional rights to privacy.  The 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has been especially outspoken over the last 
three years during the early development and implementation of fusion centers.  It has  
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published numerous reports and articles touting them as “part of an incipient de facto 
domestic intelligence system” (American Civil Liberties Union, 2008b), amongst other 
things.  
An analysis of privacy policies from three established fusion centers (Georgia, 
Arizona, and Massachusetts), various federal guidance documents and civil liberty 
advocate literature on privacy, civil liberty infringement and the sharing of information in 
fusion centers was conducted for this thesis.  Recommendations are provided for the state 
of New Hampshire’s Information and Analysis Center as the basis for developing a 
privacy and civil liberty policy framework that maintains the integrity of the information, 
protects citizens’ rights, and achieves the mission of the center.  
State and local fusion centers have diverse needs, characteristics, priorities, 
threats and vulnerabilities, as well as state laws and statues that have thus far prevented a 
national fusion center model due to the functional necessity and the inherent nature of 
state’s rights and perspectives; inclusive of privacy policies.  Currently, fusion centers 
follow different regulations and fall under different authorities. This creates a significant 
challenge for the federal government, in collaboration with states, to develop a 
comprehensive framework that is specific enough to address current opposition to 
privacy impingement, yet remain flexible enough that it could be applicable for 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
We have met the enemy and he is us. 
 —Pogo 
The Twin Towers in New York are gone, along with more than 3,000 
innocent Americans.  The United Airlines Flight 93 crash in Shanksville, 
Pa; the American Airlines Flight 77 crash into the Pentagon; bombings of 
the USS Cole, the U.S. Embassies in Africa and the Khobar Towers in 
Saudi Arabia; the 2005 London Bombings; the Madrid train bombings in 
2004 and numerous other acts of terrorism committed by Islamic 
terrorists—it’s an indisputable fact that all these events happened.  That 
the United States has not had another major terrorist strike since 
September 11, 2001, is not by accident, nor can it be attributed to good 
luck; rather, it’s due to the efforts and hard work of thousands of dedicated 
Americans who are involved in the counterterrorism effort to thwart 
attacks on our homeland. (Rogers, 2008, p. 9) 
In the post-9/11 era, the United States as a community has called for law 
enforcement at the federal, state and local levels to increase their partnerships and work 
closer with all disciplines in order to expand the capacity of the nation to thwart crime 
and terrorism.  Before 9/11, there were only a few states that had fusion centers that 
coordinated the collection, analysis and sharing of terrorism and law enforcement 
information. These were predominantly law enforcement centric centers.  On August 3, 
2007, President George W. Bush signed into law the Implementing Recommendations of 
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act) which legally authorized the 
creation of fusion centers.  Since that time, there has been controversy with their mission, 
oversight, funding and future. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
A fusion center is defined as a “collaborative effort of two or more agencies that 
provide resources, expertise and information to the center with the goal of maximizing 
their ability to detect, prevent, investigate and respond to criminal and terrorist activity” 
(DOJ & DHS, 2006, p. 2).  The goal of the fusion center “is to rapidly identify emerging 
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threats; support multidisciplinary, proactive, and community-focused problem-solving 
activities; support predictive analysis capabilities; and improve the delivery of emergency 
and nonemergency services” (Department of Justice & Department of Homeland Security 
[DOJ & DHS], 2006, p. 13).  Researchers on fusion centers have suggested that in an 
ideal world, fusion centers would involve every level and discipline of government, 
private sector entities and the public to ensure information from all sources is collected, 
blended, analyzed and evaluated for relevant information on a continual basis.  There is 
no single source for terrorism–related information, as various pieces of information can 
come through a variety of efforts within the intelligence community: federal, state and 
local law enforcement; fire service; emergency management; health and other 
government entities, as well as private sectors such as energy, transportation and 
healthcare. Fusion centers afford the opportunity for collaboration of information from 
such diverse sources. 
A fusion center is not a traditional intelligence center, nor is it an emergency 
operations center (EOC); it is a support center that may contain aspects of each of these 
organizations and is analysis driven.  Both an intelligence center and an EOC have 
specific missions, goals and priorities yet must work together to understand, collaborate 
and enhance the information-sharing process.  There is no single model for a fusion 
center due to the diverse needs and environmental characteristics of each state that affects 
the structure, processes and products of a center.  A Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) report published in January 2008 stated that 40 percent of fusion centers labeled 
themselves as “all-crime” centers, while another 40 percent labeled themselves “all-
hazards” as well as “all-crimes” (Rollins, 2008).  The definitions of these terms were not 
consistent amongst the centers, which furthers the lack of a unified fusion center model 
across the nation.  However, regardless of the definition, fusion centers enhance states’ 
abilities to collect, analyze and share information—intel—domestically.  State and local 
law enforcement officers, who are adequately equipped, trained and fully integrated into 
an information and intelligence-sharing network, can be invaluable assets in efforts to 
assist in identifying and apprehending suspected terrorists.  An example of this training is  
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in Arizona, where fusion center personnel train local law enforcement to recognize signs 
of potential terrorist activity and the significance of relating that information back to the 
fusion center for further analysis. 
Former Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production, 
Mark Lowenthal, differentiates intelligence from information in the following way: 
Information is anything that can be known, regardless of how it is 
discovered.  Intelligence refers to information that meets the stated or 
understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed, and 
narrowed to meet those needs.  Intelligence is a subset of the broader 
category of information.  Intelligence and the entire process by which it is 
identified, obtained, and analyzed respond to the needs of policy makers.  
All intelligence is information; not all information is intelligence.  (2006, 
p. 1) 
The 9/11 Commission Act makes extensive recommendations, from its findings, 
for changes that can be made to help prevent a similar attack to the homeland in the 
future.  Amongst other things, it specifically calls for a national intelligence chief, a 
counterterrorism center and increased information sharing.  The report states, “the system 
of ‘need to know’ should be replaced by a system of ‘need to share.’” This directly 
correlates to fusion centers, which were officially created by the Act.  The Act directs the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to engage and partner with fusion centers in 
various ways.  DHS’s vision of embedding officers from the Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis (I&A) in fusion centers will allow the states to access DHS information sharing 
systems. (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States [9/11 
Commission], 2007) It will also provide them with 24/7 direct access to I&A’s 
Intelligence Watch and Warning Division, which can provide states with the latest threat 
information on a nationwide basis.  Conversely, DHS officers in the fusion centers can 
provide infrastructure and analytical context to information, augment the analytical 
capabilities of fusion centers and provide real-time situational awareness to DHS in times 
of crisis.  Depending on the centers’ construct and maturity, these capabilities may or 
may not be realized.  DHS is optimistic that with further I&A, analysts embedded with 
the states, and the release of the baseline capabilities document as a guiding principle, 
that their vision will come to fruition.   
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B. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTY CONCERNS WITH FUSION CENTERS 
The notion of what privacy is and what is covered differs depending upon the 
situation and context, but it can include things such as a person’s values, behavior, data 
(personally identifiable), health and their communication and transportation methods.  
Merriman-Webster defines privacy as “the quality or state of being apart from company 
or observation” and “freedom from unauthorized intrusion” (Merriam Webster Editorial 
Staff, 2003).  These areas are broad in scope and create cause for concern among privacy 
advocates, particularly when related to the intelligence cycle that fusion centers follow.  
One of the many responsibilities fusion centers need to balance is the (privacy) rights of 
citizens and the task of information collecting and sharing in order to prevent crime and 
terrorism in the homeland.  The U.S. House of Representatives report Wasted Lessons of 
9/11 states:  
For fusion centers to be effective, they must not only have adequate 
resources but also rigorous privacy and civil liberties protections built into 
their procedures and activities.  Without these safeguards, the public will 
rightly become wary of or even outright opposed to them.  (2008, p. 27) 
The fusion process inherently allows for the modification of current data with new 
data in order to provide actionable knowledge/intelligence for multiple disciplines.   
There are concerns among many privacy advocates that the increased growth in 
fusion centers may impinge upon citizens’ civil rights, liberties and privacy.  
Contributing to this fact is the public’s limited understanding of what the fusion process 
entails.  Privacy advocates fear that these centers may become the next iteration of 
centralized surveillance of citizens.  Privacy advocates and civil liberties groups are 
concerned that the risks of consolidating threat information processes may include 
information on individuals that impinge upon their constitutional rights to privacy.   
Opponents of fusion centers, such as the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and the Cato Institute have been 
outspoken over the last three years during the early development and implementation  
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phases.  They have published numerous reports and articles touting fusion centers as 
“part of an incipient de facto domestic intelligence system” (American Civil Liberties 
Union [ACLU], 2008b.), among other things.  
As federal data collection and analysis programs become fully functional and 
accessible by fusion centers, some privacy advocates might see this as a devolution of 
national intelligence capabilities from the federal government to state government.  Some 
are also concerned that as fusion centers and the intelligence community (IC) agencies 
codify relationships, there is an increased potential for misuse of private sector data 
(Massee, O’Neil & Rollins, 2007). 
There are concerns by the ACLU and other privacy entities with having DHS 
performing a coordinating role at the federal level with respect to these centers.  
According to Masse et al., “We are granting extraordinary powers to one agency, without 
adequate transparency or safeguards, that hasn’t shown Congress that it’s ready for the 
job” (2007, pp. 11–12). 
ACLU Senior Legislative Counsel, Tim Sparapani, stated, “DHS has begun a 
downward spiral that continues to strip away individual privacy and rights, as well as 
trample the sovereignty of the states” (ACLU, 2008a).  The ACLU has made 
recommendations to help preserve privacy, with what it says will not endanger security of 
the nation but protect citizen rights.  It encourages state legislatures to create checks and 
balances on fusion centers to ensure that mission and objectives are proper. 
Cato Institute Director of Information Policy Studies, Jim Harper, stated “Further 
federal incursion into decentralized, state- and locality-based law-enforcement experience 
and expertise would be a mistake” (Harper, 2007). 
The value of fusion centers is clear, by integrating the various streams of 
information and intelligence from federal, state and local resources, as well as the private 
sector, a more accurate picture of risks to people, the economy, infrastructure and 
communities can be developed and translated into actionable measures.  While fusion  
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centers have incredible possibilities, there has to be vigilance to assure that the all-hazard, 
all-crime and counter-terrorism activities undertaken at fusion centers do not compromise 
the Constitution. 
The fusion center approach poses potential privacy and constitutional 
implications; however, these implications have not been fully explored either in principle 
or in practice.  It is an appropriate time to stop, review those operational fusion centers 
currently deployed and evaluate how they operate and what they actually do and then 
follow the trail through the legal impact on those issues and make adjustments, where 
necessary, in an effort to prevent another terrorist attack on the nation. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What recommendations can be provided to the New Hampshire Information and 
Analysis Center (NH IAC) to develop a privacy and civil liberty policy framework that 
maintains the integrity of the information, protects citizen’s rights and achieves the 
mission of the center, which is to provide actionable intelligence to the right people, at 
the right time and for the right purpose? 
D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Research conducted in order to answer the thesis question provided significant 
findings in the fusion center privacy and civil liberty privacy policy protections.  There 
are centers with successful policies, some with purported violations and still others with 
substantiated violations of their policies.   
The federal government has developed a wealth of information and guidance for 
states to utilize in the creation of a privacy policy for their fusion center.  One such 
document is the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers: A 
Supplement to the Fusion Center Guidelines (Department of Justice and Department of 
Homeland Security [DOJ & DHS], 2008), which outlines five specific privacy 
requirements for centers to achieve in order to meet the identified baseline requirements.  
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These recommendations and others are outlined in Chapter IV to provide 
assistance in the development a privacy policy, not only for the NH IAC, but also for 
other centers that may be at the same point or for those considering a revision of their 
privacy policy.   
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology to be utilized for this thesis will be case studies that specifically 
review established fusion center privacy and civil liberty programs.  The case studies will 
focus on privacy and civil liberty documents from Georgia, Massachusetts and Arizona.  
These state fusion centers have been established for several years and are viewed by DHS 
and states as examples of model practices for fusion center development.  By reviewing 
each state’s program against federal guidelines and defining gaps, lessons can be learned 
in order to make appropriate (policy) recommendations to address those challenges 
facing New Hampshire’s Information and Analysis Center, as well as fusion centers 
nationwide, regarding privacy and civil liberty concerns by the ACLU and other privacy 
organizations. 
F. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH  
1. Literature Review 
Substantial work has been done to establish minimum guidelines and standards 
for addressing privacy issues in fusion center operations.  Nonetheless, critics and public 
opinion, in general, suggest that there is a lack of trust that the policies are truly effective 
to comprehensively protect privacy and civil liberties rights.  This thesis will delve into 
effective privacy and civil liberty policy frameworks, and how an effective framework 
can be implemented while still maintaining the integrity of the information and the 
mission of the fusion center. 
State and first responders who are adequately equipped, trained and fully 
integrated into an information and intelligence-sharing network can be invaluable assets 
in efforts to assist in identifying and apprehending suspected terrorists.  According to the 
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National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, “Sharing is founded upon trust between the 
information provider and the intelligence consumer.  Such trust is most often fostered on 
an interpersonal basis; therefore, law enforcement task forces and other joint work 
endeavors succeed where collocated, interspersed personnel from different agencies and 
job types convene for a common purpose.”  (Global Justice Information Sharing Imitative 
[Global], 2003, p .9). 
The creation of state and local fusion centers has caused advocacy groups to raise 
questions about privacy and civil liberties that are being compromised, information being 
used inappropriately and unnecessarily and questioning the unknown manner in which 
information is collected, stored and disseminated.  Fusion centers have taken steps to 
ensure privacy and civil liberties are protected by developing multidisciplinary 
governance structures, including external oversight, the development of policies and 
procedures and the adoption and adherence to 28 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 
23, developing audit checklists, and adherence to applicable state and federal 
constitutional and statutory privacy and civil liberties provisions.  The National Research 
Council states, “Privacy is, and should continue to be, a fundamental dimension of living 
in a free, democratic society”  (2008, p. 9) and that “Even under the pressure of threats as 
serious as terrorism, the privacy rights and civil liberties that are the cherished core 
values of our nation must not be destroyed”  (2008, p. 4). 
Questions will arise for fusion center officials when attempting to balance and 
understand privacy interests while collecting, aggregating and disseminating information.  
For example: what will the information be used for, where does the information come 
from and what are the consequences for the individual whose information is at issue?  
According to Gregory Treverton, “In principle, effects on privacy and civil liberties 
should be determined by the mission and rules governing collecting, storage, and sharing 
of information, not on the design of the organization doing the collecting and storing” 
(2008, p. xviii). 
Literature published related to privacy and civil liberty concerns of state fusion 
centers is varied from both the government and privacy advocate perspectives.  Literature  
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sources can be grouped as follows: government documents/guidelines/resources, 
Congressional Research Service and best practice reports, privacy and civil liberty 
documents/articles/research and independent polls/research. 
Substantial oversight regarding the operation of fusion centers is already in place.  
However, shortfalls exist about the assessment of existing privacy and civil liberty 
programs that review policy, resource and organizational implications and considerations 
against federal guidance.  The federal government has developed extensive guidelines 
and resource frameworks for fusion centers regarding protecting privacy and other issues.  
There are challenges related to how the guidance will be implemented, as well as the 
roles, responsibilities and accountability assignments for the participants.  The State 
Fusion Center Processes and Procedures: Best Practices and Recommendations states, 
“Independent oversight is a valuable management function that should be sought and 
welcomed” (Rollins & Connors, 2007, p. 8).  They also state, “It is in the best interest of 
the center to have an independent authority validate that the center is operating within 
constitutional and legal limits and that appropriate accountability actions are taken when 
mistakes are discovered” (Rollins & Connors, 2007, p. 8).  
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of 
Justice Assistance, in collaboration with DOJ’s Global Justice Information Sharing 
Initiative and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2006, have developed and 
issued the Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and 
Intelligence in a New Era.  According to the Hugo Teufel, Chief Privacy Officer for 
DHS, “These guidelines are intended to ensure that fusion centers are established and 
operated consistently, resulting in enhanced coordination, strengthened partnerships and 
improved crime-fighting and anti-terrorism capabilities” (2007, p. 4).  There are specific 
guidelines in the document that discuss the development of a comprehensive privacy 
policy.  Recommendations suggest that fusion centers complete privacy impact 
assessments to understand the effect that technology and operational choices have on 
privacy and contribute to enhanced protections.  While the federal government does not 
mandate these guidelines, all fusion centers have agreed to follow them, to-date. 
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DHS Chief Privacy Officer, Hugo Teufel testified that: 
Implementing these fusion center guidelines provides an important first 
step in applying appropriate privacy protections as required under the 
“Guidelines to Ensure that the Information Privacy and other Legal Rights 
of Americans are Protected in Development and use of the Information 
Sharing Environment.”  (2007, p.3)   
The U.S. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 emphasizes 
the prevention of terrorism through the sharing of information and a structured, 
information-sharing environment formalizes the establishment of state fusion centers.  
Although the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) Privacy Guidelines are not 
applicable to state or local fusion centers, federal entities must ensure that any 
information shared with fusion centers have privacy protection guidelines that are at least 
as comprehensive as the ISE guidelines.  States are well served by utilizing the ISE 
guidelines as a starting point.  This approach replicates efforts that have already been 
scrutinized and may shield future fusion centers from criticism of advocacy groups. 
The most recent federal document addressing fusion centers is the Baseline 
Capabilities for Stare and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers: A Supplement to the 
Fusion Center Guidelines.  The document assists fusion centers in the identification, 
prioritization and allocation of resources necessary to achieve baseline levels of 
capability based on locally identified needs.  When a center achieves this baseline, it will 
have the essential structures, processes and tools available to support gathering, 
processing, analyzing and disseminating terrorism, homeland security and law 
enforcement information for all levels of government and the private sector, where 
appropriate.  Terrorism and criminal activity are frequently related, therefore, analyzing 
them simultaneously is prudent. 
Civil liberty groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union, the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and the Cato Institute have been candid with their 
opinions about the concept of fusion centers prior to 9/11; they do not like them.  Lillie 
Conley stated:  
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Investigations conducted by the Congressional Research Service, ACLU, 
EPIC, and others raise more questions than are answered about the real 
world implications of the Department of Homeland Security’s role in the 
development of intelligence fusion centers.  EPIC concluded that 
Intelligence fusion center development and implementation is unfocused 
and undirected. (2007, p .9) 
States have the mechanisms and capabilities to protect citizen’s rights and it is up 
to each state to ensure it does so within the context of state, local and federal laws as well 
as the constitution.   
2. Future Research Efforts 
The significance of this research will assist in the creation of a privacy and civil 
liberty program for New Hampshire’s Information and Analysis Center through the 
recommendations of comprehensive policies and procedures.  This thesis will also outline 
recommendations that may influence the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to 
institute changes in federal guidance to state and local fusion centers. 
3. Immediate Consumer/Customer 
The immediate consumer or customer of this research will be the New Hampshire 
Department of Safety, Homeland Security and Emergency Management to utilize in the 
establishment of the New Hampshire Information and Analysis Center.   
4. HS Practitioners and Leaders Nationally 
The research will assist practitioners in Homeland Security and Fusion Centers to 
understand the necessary requirements to have a solid privacy and civil liberty program 
that satisfies the needs of the local and state government, in addition to privacy groups 
concerned with civil liberty rights. 
The next section of this thesis will provide background and context for the reader 
on some of the issues and obstacles of privacy policies, which will then lead into a 
discussion of the importance and implications of privacy policies for fusion centers.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom.  
 —William Orville Douglas, U.S. Supreme Court 
A. FUSION CENTER’S ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
The fusion center is focused on information collection, integration, evaluation, 
analytic processes and the distribution of enhanced information to its constituents.  This 
is all completed through the fusion process which “refers to the overarching process of 
managing the flow of information and intelligence across all levels and sectors of 
government and private industry … supports the implementation of risk-based, 
information-driven prevention, response, and consequence management programs”  (DOJ 
& DHS, 2006, p. 3).  One of the primary missions of a fusion center is information 
sharing, which Figure 1 illustrates broadly.  The Fusion Center Guidelines state:  
Users access the data via a common interface, extracting, analyzing, and 
disseminating information based on need and current demands.  Although 
it is anticipated that fusion and fusion centers will primarily be used for 
preventive and proactive measures, the process will also be critical if an 
incident occurs, providing information to responders as well as officials, 
media, and citizens.” (DOJ &DHS, 2006, p. 11)   
This process affords all participating entities with the ability to provide and 
receive synthesized information.   
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Figure 1.   Distributed Information Sources within a Fusion Center  
(From DOJ, 2006, p. 11) 
As the fusion center concept relies on numerous entities with varying 
responsibilities and capabilities in operationalizing a fusion center, one of the essential 
objectives is to gain “buy-in” from all the key stakeholders in the state.  Figure 2 
illustrates the flow and processing of information within a fusion center.   
The concept depicted is that the information is received as raw data and 
intelligence from various entities, analysts then integrate the diverse data and provide 
analytic output that may include, but not be limited to, information to prevent an incident,  
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identification of the need to harden a facility or it may identify the need to conduct a 
threat assessment.  This is all referred to the in the fusion process as actionable 
intelligence.  
 
Figure 2.   Information Flow and Process (From Carter, 2008, p. 16) 
Effective all-hazard, all-crime and counterterrorism related prevention, protection, 
preparedness, response and recovery efforts depend on timely and accurate information. 
This information covers a wide range of topics, such as weather events that may cause 
damage and/or injury, where crimes are committed and on the counter-terrorism side, 
who the enemy is, where they operate, how they are supported, their intended target and 
the method of attack.    
According to the Fusion Center Guidelines, “a fusion center is an effective and 
efficient mechanism to exchange information and intelligence, maximize resources, 
streamline operations, and improve the ability to fight crime and terrorism by analyzing 
data from a variety of sources” (DOJ & DHS, 2006, p. 2.).  Additionally, the Guidelines 
state, “Fusion centers embody the core of collaboration, and as demands increase and 
resources decrease, fusion centers will become an effective tool to maximize available 
resources and build trusted relationships” (DOJ & DHS, 2006, p. 4.) 
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The U.S. Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security Baseline 
Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers states: 
While it is acknowledged that the Intelligence Process is different from the 
Fusion Process, the basic foundational steps of the intelligence process can 
be applied to identifying the baseline capabilities fusion centers should 
strive to achieve in regards to information and intelligence collection, 
collation, analysis and dissemination.  (2008, p. 9.)   
The intelligence process involves a series of steps as outlined in Figure 3.  This 
illustrates a professional and dynamic approach to identify and counter threats, utilizing 
intelligence assets and functions.  The desire is for this process to be objective, unbiased, 
without prejudice, and it must be based on accurate and relevant facts with due 
consideration for the privacy and constitutional rights of individuals, groups and 
organizations.  The intelligence process can be realized as a series of decision-making 
points, with each point requiring a decision to be made from several alternatives, with 
each resulting with their own consequence—positive or negative.  The adoption of a 
policy that addresses the protection of individual privacy and constitutional rights and 
attempts to eliminate unnecessary discretion in the decision-making process, guide the 
necessary discretion and ensure conformance with the policy goal(s) is an optimal 
outcome of this process. 
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Figure 3.   Intelligence Process (From DOJ & DHS, 2006, p. 19) 
Some security experts indicate that the lack of a national model for developing 
fusion centers is a mistake.  The fact that state and local fusion centers have diverse 
needs, characteristics, priorities, as well as state laws may prevent a national model due 
to the functional necessity and the inherent nature of states’ rights and perspectives.  This 
may not be a mistake.  Entities within fusion centers will vary due to their functional 
configuration.  Figure 4 outlines this collaborative nature.  Fusion centers “focus on 
collaboration and analysis and will become a repository for information that flows 
through the center, while ensuring state and federal privacy laws and requirements are 
adhered to” (DOJ & DHS, 2006, p. 13). 
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Figure 4.   Participating Entities within a Fusion Center  
(From DOJ & DHS, 2006, p. 13) 
Multiple strategies and technologies must be developed for diverse two-way 
information sharing to capture information from non-traditional stakeholders and to provide 
threat-based intelligence and intelligence requirements back to those who have the need to 
know.  A lack of information sharing and ability to provide timely and actionable intelligence 
were identified failures of 9/11. Between and among all the reports, commissions, white 
papers, books and array of other literature and lessons learned in the eight years since 9/11, it 
should be realized by those in the intelligence community that there is value added in 
working in partnership with a cross-section of diverse stakeholders to ensure the safety and 
security of U.S. citizens.  The more information that is communicated between and amongst 
all stakeholders, the more knowledgeable the community at large becomes on the subject 
matter—whether it is criminal, all-hazard or counter-terrorism in nature.  Masse et al., “The 
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rise of fusion centers is representative of a recognition that non-traditional actors—state and 
local law enforcement and public safety agencies—have an important role to play in 
homeland defense and security” (2007, p. 2).  With the desire to further communications and 
the flow of information, comes the need to be acutely aware of the issues of privacy and civil 
liberties and protection of information. The National Strategy for Information Sharing states: 
Protecting the rights of Americans is a core facet of our information 
sharing efforts.  While we must zealously protect our Nation from the real 
and continuing threat of terrorist attacks, we must just as zealously protect 
the information privacy rights and other legal rights of Americans.  With 
proper planning we can have both enhanced privacy protections and 
increased information sharing.  (2007, p. 27) 
It is important to note that with the rise of fusion centers across the nation and 
value-added that they bring to the entities involved in them, not every state has bought 
into the concept to-date.  About two years ago, the state of New Hampshire started to 
engage various stakeholders within state government on the applicability and feasibility 
of establishing a center.  The New Hampshire Information and Analysis Center (IAC) 
will serve as the statewide nucleus for information collection, analysis and dissemination 
of all-hazard, all-crime and counter-terrorism threats to the state.  The current plan, as 
outlined in the New Hampshire Emergency Management Preparedness Grant (EMGP) 
work plan, is to develop resources to provide secure information sharing as well as 
information collection for the purposes of developing intelligence for its stakeholders 
(New Hampshire Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 2008).  The IAC 
plans to support local entities with access to federal information sources and restricted 
databases as well as analytic services to support complex incidents, as appropriate, 
through such means as the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), Homeland 
Secure Data Network (HSDN), Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence 
Community (HS SLIC) and an array of others.  Access to certain information will be 
restricted based on a need to know and right to know as required by New Hampshire state 
statutes, the New Hampshire Constitution and 28 CFR Part 23.  Once the IAC is 
operational, actionable intelligence products will be provided to local stakeholders based 
upon the defined threat made from ongoing assessments and information and intelligence 
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needs defined by the stakeholders.  David Carter, author of Law Enforcement 
Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies: 
The four greatest challenges are: 1. Develop a cooperative and committed 
relationship between all stakeholders; 2. Ensure privacy and protection of 
personal identifying information; 2. Establish policies and process that 
support efficient, effective and lawful intelligence operations; and 4. Stay 
on message as an analytic center.  (2009, p.195)   
Officials in New Hampshire have had discussions with privacy advocates, as well 
as legislators on these very issues already.  They will be area’s requiring constant focus 
and attention as the process to build out the IAC moves forward.  The New Hampshire 
Department of Safety worked closely with these groups and put forth legislation to create 
the IAC in the 2008 session.  The bill passed the House but died in the Senate for reasons 
unknown to this author.  The Department has met several times since with the legislator 
to discuss furthering the IAC and, more specifically, regarding privacy and civil liberty 
rights of New Hampshire citizens and the importance of transparency and the assurance 
of these rights as the IAC moves forward. 
As fusion centers expand and disciplines work closer with each other, they begin 
to create a synergy. If each of them has a piece of the puzzle and work as a team, the 
puzzle can be put together by working smarter, not harder.  This is true for New 
Hampshire as well, in that there are only so many resources (personnel), so optimizing 
time, skills and energy will maximize those resources to the fullest potential through the 
team approach. 
B. NEW HAMPSHIRE REVISED STATUES ANNOTATED (RSA) 
CHAPTER 91–A 
The Right-To-Know law balances the citizens’ rights-to-know with right to keep 
certain aspects of their interactions with government and certain personal information the 
government maintains on them private.  This law dissects all components of state 
government—unless otherwise annotated.   
Revised Statutes Annotated (RSA) 91-A:1 Preamble states, “Openness in the 
conduct of public business is essential to a democratic society. …ensure both the greatest 
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possible public access to the actions, discussions and records of all public bodies, and 
their accountability to the people” (New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated 
[NHRSA], 1977).  This law provides a clear, concise outline of citizens’ rights within the 
context of public meetings and their ability to request governmental records and 
information from such.  There are exemptions outlined in 91–A:5–VI that relate 
specifically to “…matters relating to the preparation for and the carrying out of all 
emergency functions…developed by local or state safety officials that are directly 
intended to thwart a deliberate act that is intended to result in widespread or severe 
damage to property or widespread injury or loss of life” (NHRSA, 2008b).  This section 
protects those discussions that directly related to terrorism, which include any planning 
documents.  This information in the wrong hands could potentially jeopardize the safety, 
security and economy of New Hampshire’s citizens, visitors and businesses. 
RSA 91-A allows for certain law enforcement investigate records to be disclosed.  
If the records requested are either investigative records or compiled for law enforcement 
purposes, they may be withheld if the law enforcement agency can prove that disclosure 
meets specific requirements outlined in the RSA.  Other confidential information utilized 
by law enforcement officers in their duty to safeguard citizens is protected under 28 CFR 
23.  This provision and 28 CRF 23 provides for the protection of information that is of 
criminal nature and under investigation; disclosure of this information could be 
detrimental to the on-going case investigation. 
New Hampshire’s Right-to-Know Law guarantees that its citizens have 
reasonable access to public meetings and records.  Additionally, New Hampshire’s 
Constitution also guarantee’s accountability to its citizens as stated in Part I, Article 8:  
All power residing originally in, and being derived from, the people, all 
the magistrates and officers of government are their substitutes and agents, 
and at all times accountable to them.  Government, therefore, should be 
open, accessible, accountable and responsive. To that end, the public’s 
right of access to governmental proceedings and records shall not be 
unreasonably restricted.” (NH Constitution, Amended, 1976) 
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New Hampshire after all, is the “Live Free or Die” state, and its citizens expect 
and enjoy the freedoms that democracy allows for to the fullest extent possible. They 
want to be informed and involved yet protected—that is, the balance that must be 
weighed. 
Appendix C is a “Compendium of New Hampshire’s Privacy and Security 
Legislation” that outlines New Hampshire’s state laws and regulations relating to privacy 
and security of criminal history record information.  According to the Department of 
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, “…the compendia are intended to promote the 
evolution of enlightened privacy and information policy” (2003, p. 1).   
C. 28 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATION PART 23 
The U.S. Department of Justice established this regulation to assure that all 
criminal intelligence systems are utilized in conformance with the privacy and 
constitutional rights of individuals.  Many fusion centers typically apply the protections 
developed for their covered criminal intelligence system for all of their systems, thus, 
familiarity and compliance with 28 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 23 serves the 
fusion centers well as they adopt recommendations of the Information Sharing 
Environment (ISE). The Department of Safety, as well as local law enforcement agencies 
in the state, follow 28 CRF Part 23 as part of their normal operating protocols.  It is the 
standard for law enforcement nationwide as it has been vetted, challenged and approved 
at the highest level of government. 
It is important for not only law enforcement but any entity working within a 
fusion center to know this policy inside and out to ensure compliance at all time.  
According to 28 CFR Part 23 policy standards:  
(1) Criminal Intelligence System or Intelligence System means the 
arrangements, equipment, facilities, and procedures used for the receipt, 
storage, interagency exchange or dissemination, and analysis of criminal 
intelligence information; (2) Interjurisdictional Intelligence System means 
an intelligence system which involves two or more participating agencies 
representing different governmental units or jurisdictions; (3) Criminal 
Intelligence Information means data which has been evaluated to 
determine that it: (i) is relevant to the identification of and the criminal 
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activity engaged in by an individual who or organization which is 
reasonably suspected of involvement in criminal activity, and (ii) meets 
criminal intelligence system submission criteria; (4) Participating Agency 
means an agency of local, county, State, Federal, or other governmental 
unit which exercises law enforcement or criminal investigation authority 
and which is authorized to submit and receive criminal intelligence 
information through an interjurisdictional intelligence system. A 
participating agency may be a member or a nonmember of an 
interjurisdictional intelligence system; (5) Intelligence Project or Project 
means the organizational unit which operates an intelligence system on 
behalf of and for the benefit of a single agency or the organization which 
operates an interjurisdictional intelligence system on behalf of a group of 
participating agencies; and (6) Validation of Information means the 
procedures governing the periodic review of criminal intelligence 
information to assure its continuing compliance with system submission 
criteria established by regulation or program policy.  (Civil Liberties & 
Privacy Office, 2008)   
D. FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES 
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development created eight 
privacy design principles known as the Fair Information Practices (FIP).  These 
principles are: transparency, individual participation, purpose specification, data 
minimization, use limitation, data quality and integrity, security, and accountability and 
auditing; these eight principles are the universal standard for privacy protection.  DHS 
instituted the FIP as its foundation for privacy policy and implementation across the 
Department in 2008.  The principles are highlighted in Guideline 8 of the Fusion Center 
Guidelines and are reiterated in Section II of the Baseline Capabilities document. (DOJ & 
DHS, 2008)   The FIPs form the basis for privacy compliance policies and procedures 
governing the use of personally identifiable information. In an era with increasing 
technology and digitization of individuals' information, having fundamental information 
practices firmly in place is crucial to a well-balanced, unbiased society.   
Critics of FIPs can be found on both sides.  Some in the privacy field believe that 
FIPs are too ineffective, allow too many exemptions, do not require a privacy agency, fail 
to account for the weaknesses of self-regulation and have not kept pace with the 
increasing use of information technology.  Critics from a business perspective want to 
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limit FIPs to reduce elements of notice, consent and accountability and complain that 
other elements are impracticable, costly or not consistent with openness or free speech 
standards.  FIPs were developed to help facilitate the balance between the right to privacy 
while ensuring the safety of citizens and the ability to discover bad people who want to 
do bad things before they can implement those kinds of scenarios in the United States.  
E. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND HOMELAND SECURITY 
GUIDANCE 
The federal government has developed and provided significant guidance and 
resource frameworks for state and local fusion centers regarding protecting privacy and 
civil liberties for their citizens.  The following information provides background and 
context for the case studies in Chapter III that focus on privacy policies in established 
fusion centers. 
1. Fusion Center Guidelines 
The U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
developed the all-crime, all-hazard “Fusion Center Guidelines” in August 2006 in an 
effort “…to ensure that fusion centers are established and operated consistently, resulting 
in enhanced coordination efforts, strengthened partnerships, and improved crime-fighting 
and antiterrorism capabilities” (DOJ & DHS, 2006, p. 2).  There are 18 guidelines that 
state and local entities can utilize in the development of a fusion center to ensure 
consistency and continuity in an effort to share intelligence information across the nation 
both vertically and horizontally.  At a minimum, each guideline has sections for 
justification of the specific topic, issues for consideration when developing the topic and 
additional resources for further guidance on the topic.  Guideline 8 specifically addresses 
the development, publication and adherence to privacy and civil liberty policies.  The 
guideline references the “Privacy Policy Development Guide,”  “Privacy and Civil Rights 
Policy Template for Justice Information Systems” and the “Fair Information Practices” as 
documents and tools to be utilized in developing a Privacy and Civil Liberty Policy (DOJ 
& DHS, 2006, p. 41).  The guidelines are not mandated, they merely provide a starting 
point for the development of a fusion center privacy policy.  Legal counsel will be 
   25 
 
required to ensure that it will meet the mark for the specific state in adhering with its 
constitution, laws and its citizen’s right to know about the fusion center mission.  
2. Baseline Capabilities for Fusion Centers 
The Baseline Capabilities for Fusion Centers, developed by the U.S. Department 
of Justice and U.S. Department of Homeland Security in September 2008, is a 
supplement to the Fusion Center Guidelines.  This document identifies the baseline 
capabilities for fusion centers and the operational standards necessary to achieve each of 
the capabilities. According to the guidance, “By achieving this baseline level of 
capability, a fusion center will have the necessary structures, processes, and tools in place 
to support the gathering, processing, analysis, and dissemination of terrorism, homeland 
security, and law enforcement information” (DOJ & DHS, 2008, p. 1). According to the 
Baseline Capabilities document, “The achievement of the information privacy protections 
capabilities will result in a fusion center privacy protection policy that meets the Section 
12.d. requirement of the Information Sharing Environment Privacy Guidelines” (DOJ & 
DHS, 2008, p. 27). From an operational perspective, since each center is unique in its 
structure, the baseline capabilities provide the flexibility to work within various settings; 
all crimes, all-hazards and counter-terrorism or a combination of one, two or all three.  
DHS estimates it could take fusion centers up to five years to achieve all the baseline 
capabilities, due to varying constraints on and maturity of each fusion center.  Once a 
fusion center reaches the baseline capabilities, it will take focused concentration in order 
to sustain the center. This is because there will be distractions over funding, governance, 
privacy and politics, only to mention a few; however, all of these have the potential to 
obliterate a center if there is not a constant feeding and nurturing of its mission and goals. 
3. Information Sharing Environment 
Thomas E. McNamara, Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment 
stated:  
Recognizing the need to go beyond individual solutions to create an 
environment—the aggregation of legal, policy, cultural, organizational, 
and technological conditions—for improving information sharing, 
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Congress passed and the President signed the landmark Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).  The Act requires 
the President to establish an Information Sharing Environment (ISE), “for 
the sharing of terrorism information in a manner consistent with national  
security and with applicable legal standards relating to privacy and civil 
liberties.”  (Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment, 2006,  
p. xiii)   
ISE priorities focus on facilitating, coordinating and expediting access to 
protected terrorism information to the intelligence, law enforcement, defense, homeland 
security and foreign affairs communities.  The ISE challenge is to gather all types of data, 
from all levels of security, including structured and unstructured data and finished 
intelligence products, and to integrate the data with terrorism information and provide 
access to that information to everyone in the ISE.  The ISE privacy guidelines are not 
applicable to state or local fusion centers; however, federal entities must ensure that any 
information shared with fusion centers have privacy protection guidelines that are at least 
as comprehensive as the ISE guidelines.  By utilizing the ISE guidelines, states can meet 
the federal requirements easily as the approach replicates efforts that have already been 
scrutinized, therefore, safeguarding fusion centers from criticism of advocacy groups. 
The three federal documents described above build upon one another in a 
sequential process to ensure cohesive, compatible and compliant fusion centers are 
created across the nation to promote a uniform manner of sharing intelligence 
information to various disciplines based on the topic and need to know.  The sharing of 
information is vital to ensuring the nation’s security from criminals and terrorist 
organizations whose intent is to harm the United States.  Privacy, civil liberty and 
information policies must be implemented that will safeguard and strengthen the public’s 
confidence in an agency’s ability to handle information appropriately.  The policies will 
reinforce support for the agency’s information management efforts in utilizing 
technology, which will in turn bolster effective and responsible sharing of information 
that maintains the primary concepts of the justice system in the United States. 
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F. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (ACLU) AND ELECTRONIC 
PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER (EPIC) 
The two leading opponents of fusion centers are the American Civil Liberties 
Union and the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC).  Both have spent numerous 
hours and staff time on the topic of fusion centers.  Moreover, they have testified before 
congressional hearings, written articles and posted information on their Web sites 
downplaying centers’ ability to protect citizens’ privacy and civil liberties within the 
confines of the law.  
The ACLU has spoken out about the development of fusion centers since their 
inception.  It has published numerous reports and articles claiming them to be “part of an 
incipient de facto domestic intelligence system” (ACLU, 2008b).  In its publication, 
“What’s Wrong With Fusion Centers,” five specific problems with fusion centers are 
identified: 
 Ambiguous Lines of Authority.  Overlapping jurisdictions create the 
potential for manipulation of differing laws to evade accountability. 
 Private Sector Participation.  Fusion centers are incorporating private 
corporations into the intelligence process, further threatening privacy. 
 Military Participation.  Fusion centers are involving military personnel in 
law enforcement activities in troubling ways. 
 Data Mining.  Federal fusion center guidelines encourage wholesale data 
collection and manipulation processes that threaten privacy. 
 Excessive Secrecy.  Public oversight, individual redress and the very 
effectiveness of fusion centers are threatened by excessive secrecy.  
(German & Stanley, 2007)  
Dr. David L. Carter (2008) counters the ACLU allegations in The Intelligence 
Fusion Process, using very clear terminology as to why each of these five items are not 
issues and should not be of public concern regarding fusion center operations.  Fusion 
centers may appear somewhat suspicious and secretive to those that do not understand 
their concept, purpose, mission and goals.  According to Carter:  
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There is a concern among many privacy advocates that the growth of 
fusion centers will increase the jeopardy to citizens’ civil rights, liberties 
and privacy. … Complicating this issue is the fact that not understanding 
the concept of the fusion process, many privacy advocates fear that the 
centers are the next iteration of centralized surveillance of citizens. (2008, 
p. 23) 
Privacy advocates and civil liberty groups are concerned about the risks 
associated with consolidating threat information; however, authorities feel the benefits 
outweigh these risks.  Some fusion centers are extremely open with their information 
practices and share their standard operating procedures with the public; others do not.  
This lack of consistency creates disparity among fusion centers as a whole, thus 
compounding the opponents’ concerns.  The 9/11 Commission Report (2007) states:  
The choice between security and liberty is a false choice, as nothing is 
more likely to endanger America’s liberties than the success of a terrorist 
attack at home.  Our history has shown us that insecurity threatens liberty.  
Yet, if our liberties are curtailed, we lose the values that we are struggling 
to defend.  (2007, p. 395) 
The ACLU, EPIC and other advocates are concerned with private sector entities 
being incorporated into fusion centers.  They infer that the relationship between the 
fusion center and private entities will lead to unfair business advantages by permitting the 
utilization of classified information and the potential for legal processes to be 
circumvented.  Ben Bain (2008) stated:  
Since 2007 the government has released a series of documents and 
strategies defining the federal vision for the state and locally-owned and 
operated centers. … laid out specific roles for fusion centers in the federal 
government’s information sharing environment that authorities use to 
exchange terrorism-related data. 
Private sector participation in fusion centers is governed by state and federal laws 
that specify what can and cannot be shared.  The private sector(s) are the owners of most 
of the critical infrastructure in this nation, not the federal, state or local government, 
which is all the more reason for the inclusion of the private sector in the information-
sharing network.  Building partnerships with private sector organizations creates an 
environment of trust that allows the sharing of (appropriate) information that ultimately 
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ensures the safety and security of U.S. citizens.  For example, New Hampshire public 
safety officials received information from a private sector organization of tampering of its 
system, and that information was shared with the department that has regulatory over that 
industry.  That department was unaware of the tampering and was extremely pleased to 
have been notified and subsequently reached out to that organization for further follow-
up.  This type of information sharing is crucial; private sector infrastructure is relied upon 
on a daily basis by citizens. Therefore, it is for the good of all that it is protected within 
the confines of the laws that regulate them. 
Advocates have raised concerns with DHS regarding its role of coordinating at the 
federal level with respect to the centers.  There is a perception from some advocates that 
the federal government is mandating the structure of fusion centers, how they collect, 
analyze and disseminate information, and what types of information is retained, as well 
as the duration and purpose.  The federal government provides guidance and some 
funding for the centers, but it does not and cannot mandate the centers operations, which 
is a state’s right and decision to make.  Mike German, policy counsel at the ACLU and 
former FBI agent, has expressed concerns regarding these and other issues associated 
with fusion centers.  The ACLU has made statements to the affect that fusion centers are 
the federal government’s attempt to create a domestic intelligence system (ACLU, 
2008b) The New Hampshire IAC is governed by the Department of Safety.  The center 
has plans to request technical assistance from DHS regarding specific topics, such as 
governance, training and baseline capabilities as it is built out.  Decisions about the IAC 
will be made by the state; DHS does not have the authority to mandate to the state the 
operation of its center, which New Hampshire fully understands. 
EPIC has stated that the federal government is responsible for recommendations 
to limit open government. It even went so far as to file a Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) request with the Virginia State Police for communication information.  Virginia 
drafted legislation to exempt its databases and records from FOIA requests; EPIC 
believes this would provide too much protection for the state.  EPIC’s Lillie Coney 
(2007) states, “There are reasons to be troubled by the development of fusion centers 
without clear policy and oversight mechanisms in place.”   
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The ACLU continues to be outspoken on the lack of continuity for privacy 
policies in fusion centers, Rebecca Bernhardt, ACLU of Texas policy director, stated:  
We cannot point to a fusion center that has an ideal privacy policy that 
ensures that when there is bad information in the fusion center, there is a 
reliable way of removing it, and that there is a policy in place that protects 
civil liberties.  (Longoria, 2009)  
The concept of privacy is broad; it encompasses different personal values and 
interests.  Public support for counterterrorism measures is influenced by people’s 
perceptions of the threat of terror: how they think the government is dealing with 
terrorism and how these actions affect their civil liberties.  Public opinion polls suggest 
that there is a diminished level of acceptance of surveillance systems and biometric 
recognition systems, which further suggests the public tends to defend civil liberties more 
in concept than in specific situations (National Research Council, 2008).  If perception is 
reality, then it is important for government to be as transparent as possible in everything 
that it does. 
New Hampshire’s initial efforts to establish an Information and Analysis Center 
identified the area of privacy and civil liberties as a high priority for planning, training 
and public outreach due to its work with the legislature.  As stated earlier, and because 
privacy advocates and civil liberties groups are concerned that the risks of consolidating 
information may include information on individuals that impinges upon their 
constitutional rights to privacy, this was an easy decision. 
The 9/11 Commission Act formally codified and established the fusion center 
initiative, however, from a national perspective, despite the clear statutory authority, 
unresolved privacy and civil liberty issues continue to threaten the fusion center initiative 
and the commitment fusion centers hold in preventing terrorist threats to the nation.   
As stated in the 9/11 Commission Report (2007), the fusion center program 
initiative falls within the scope of the information sharing environment for the sharing of 
terrorism, homeland security and law enforcement information between parties at all 
levels of government.  DOJ and DHS have developed guidelines and baseline capabilities 
to assist fusion centers; however, it is not known how effective and to what extent these 
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documents are being followed to create state privacy policies.  There are additional stand-
alone documents that explore policies, resources and organizational issues to implement 
that assure the protection of privacy and civil liberties.  However, the existence of a 
single comprehensive document to facilitate the consistent development of a state privacy 
policy would help to ensure a consistent approach in the implementation of the fusion 
center initiative (9/11 Commission, 2007). 
As fusion centers presently follow different regulations and fall under different 
authorities, the significant challenge for the federal government, working with states, is to 
develop a comprehensive framework that is specific enough to address current opposition 
to privacy impingement yet remain flexible enough that it could be applicable for 
utilization nationwide.  By reviewing and documenting existing fusion center privacy 
frameworks, New Hampshire will be in a more informed position to establish its IAC 
with an assurance that the products and documents created in the information-sharing 
environment are grounded with a clear, concise and evaluated privacy and civil liberty 
program.  
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III. ANALYZING PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTY POLICIES 
Any change, even a change for the better, is always accompanied by 
drawbacks and discomforts.  
 —Arnold Bennett, British novelist 
The following chapter will focus on privacy policies from fusion centers in 
Georgia, Massachusetts and Arizona.  These three state fusion centers have been 
established for several years and are viewed by DHS and others in the homeland security 
arena as examples of model practices for fusion center development and privacy policies.  
By reviewing these policies against federal guidelines to identify gaps, if any, lessons can 
be learned in order to make appropriate (policy) recommendations to address those 
challenges facing fusion centers nationwide regarding privacy and civil liberty concerns 
made by the ACLU and other privacy organizations.  In New Hampshire, an all-crime, 
all-hazard, counterterrorism Information and Analysis Center (IAC) is in the 
development phase.  The IAC will be managed by the Department of Safety and staffed 
with personnel from the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 
and the Division of State Police.  It will include other stakeholders when it becomes 
operational.  It is anticipated that New Hampshire will endeavor to make certain that 
information sharing will be accomplished in accordance with the state’s Constitution, 
statutes, regulations and other legal and policy requirements, including relevant privacy 
and civil liberty standards and a clearly defined process for redress.  The information 
synthesized in this chapter attempts to provide guidance to assist with the creation of a 
privacy policy for the NH IAC and other centers at the same juncture in their process. 
A. GEORGIA INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS CENTER 
The Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center (GISAC) was established 
in October 2001 under the oversight of the Georgia Office of Homeland Security.  The 
initial focus of GISAC was to address terrorism and to be the conduit for federal, state 
and local law enforcement to provide homeland security intelligence; this still remains its 
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focus eight years later.  Its primary mission is to serve as state focal point for collection, 
analysis, assessment and dissemination of terrorism intelligence relating to Georgia. 
The Georgia Office of Homeland Security (GOHS) consists of three components: 
1) Homeland Security Task Force; 2) Georgia Emergency Management Agency 
(GEMA); and 3) Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center (GISAC).  The 
Homeland Security Task Force is a committee that advises the Director of GOHS on 
issues related to homeland security and terrorism.  GEMA has six sections—finance, 
hazard mitigation, operations, public affairs, public assistance and terrorism emergency 
preparedness and response.   
According to a Government Accounting Office report:  
GISAC has four sections—law enforcement, criminal intelligence, fire 
services/hazmat, and emergency management.  GISAC has a staff of 27, a 
majority of whom are from the Georgia Bureau of Investigation due to 
their focus as an all-crime and counter-terrorism fusion center.  Other state 
and local entities with personnel assigned in the center are the Georgia 
State Patrol, Georgia Department of Corrections, Georgia National Guard, 
Georgia Sheriffs’ Association, Georgia Fire Chiefs Association and 
Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police.  DHS I&A has two staff assigned 
to GISAC with overall responsibility of providing technical assistance and 
sharing information amongst the state, local and federal governments; one 
Southeast region representative and one intelligence officer.  There are no 
FBI personnel assigned directly to GISAC; however there are two GISAC 
personnel assigned to the JTTF, which is in the same building as GISAC. 
This allows for access to FBI systems in a timely manner by GISAC 
personnel. (GAO, 2007) 
The GISAC is the only state-level agency dedicated solely to homeland security, 
antiterrorism and terrorism center operations—it does not have an all-hazards approach.  
Because GISAC is co-located with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, it enhances and 
facilitates the collection of information from local and state sources.  They integrate this 
information into a system that is accessible to homeland security and counter-terrorism 
intelligence programs in the 159 counties that encompass over 650 municipalities 
statewide.  This provides a statewide network of entities that have access to the most 
current intelligence information at their fingertips. 
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In order to facilitate effective communication and dissemination of terrorism-
related information/intelligence, GISAC has five programs aimed at fostering productive 
working relationships with local, state and federal government agencies throughout the 
state.  The programs are: 
 Counter Terrorism Task Force, which focuses on the protection of  
Georgia’s citizens, critical infrastructure, and key resources from terrorist 
attacks, major disasters and other emergencies;  
 Georgia Terrorism Intelligence Project, which utilizes a Web-based 
program to virtually share and exchange terrorism tips and leads, generate 
GIS maps and share/track assets in real time between GISAC and 6 metro 
Atlanta law enforcement agencies to-date;  
 Southern Shield comprises 13 state homeland security offices organized to 
exchange best practices, share terrorism-related intelligence and monitor 
regional terrorism threats;  
 Interstate Counter-Terrorism Operations Network is a communications 
network between GISAC and other fusion centers across the nation to 
promote information sharing; and lastly,  
 Coordinating Operations with the Atlanta FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, 
this approach consolidated operational activities of both entities so they 
receive the same information, leads, research and can investigate cases 
jointly which provides for a more coordinated and less duplicative system.  
(Georgia Emergency Management Agency [GEMA], n.d.).  
GISAC is also involved with the business and industry sector through a 
partnership that was formed in 2003 with the Business Executives for National Security 
(BENS).  BENS is a nationwide, non-partisan organization that engages senior business 
executives to enhance the nation's security by partnering with state emergency 
management officials.   
Governor Sonny Purdue worked with BENS to create the Georgia Business Force 
(GBF), which became a not-for-profit entity earlier this year.  GBF is a non-partisan 
coalition of critical infrastructure/key resource (CI/KR) companies/associations 
committed to support Georgia in preparation for and response to disasters and homeland 
security threats within its borders.  The GBF established and currently manages the 
Business Operations Center, within GEMA, to share information with CIKR entities 
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during activations of the state emergency operations center.  This partnership truly 
illustrates the cooperative and collaborative commitment that Georgia has to its homeland 
security, counter-terrorism and CIKR programs and ensuring the safety and security of its 
citizens (GEMA, n.d.). 
Figure 5 outlines the flow of information handling and evaluation at the GISAC.  
 
Figure 5.   GISAC Information Process (From English, 2007)  
Situational awareness briefings are conducted every morning between JTTF and 
GISAC personnel.  The GISAC requires all staff to have security clearances, including 
secretarial/administrative support staff.  GISAC is enhancing its capability and capacity 
to integrate terrorism emergency response and preparedness to include critical 
infrastructure protection (CIP); the current connection for CIP is through the Georgia 
Emergency Management Agency.  GISAC utilizes HSIN to funnel information to several 
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sectors and will be expanding that capability for more in future.  GISAC also functions as 
the state’s threat management center, meaning that if there is an event going on GISAC 
will monitor it and send information out to stakeholders as deemed appropriate.  This 
affords GISAC the opportunity to share information with more than law enforcement 
entities. Thus it provides situational awareness to a broader set of stakeholders that may 
have a potential interest and/or response to a particular event that is going on within their 
jurisdiction. 
An associated project between the GISAC and state and local law enforcement is 
the Georgia Terrorism Intelligence Program (GTIP).  GTIP is integrated with several 
metro Atlanta police departments, GBI and GISAC to virtually share, analyze and 
disseminate terrorism information, generate maps and share/track assets in real time. 
Seventy percent of the population of Georgia is covered with GTIP (GEMA, n.d.). GTIP 
allows the sharing of information between agencies, without having to be located in the 
same physical location, through Web technology, which ensures that all parties have the 
most up-to-date information possible with which to act upon as appropriate and 
necessary. 
GISAC has made changes to its organizational structure to expand and improve 
its capabilities over the past eight years. It has only had two directors in this timeframe, 
which is beneficial from the standpoint of consistency and continuity.  The National 
Governor’s Association recognized GISAC as one of three best practices for state level 
counter-terrorism intelligence centers in 2004.  GISAC had a lead role in developing and 
implementing intelligence operations in support of the 2004 G-8 Summit at Sea Island, 
Georgia, in collaboration with the U.S. Secret Service, due to its designation as a 
National Special Security Event.  GISAC has been and continues to be involved with 
special events within the state to provide threat assessments and overall situational 
awareness about the event for the local, state and federal implications and perspectives.  
This enhances and increases credibility with partners in the intelligence information-
sharing environment. 
The legal authority for GISAC’s role and function in collecting and analyzing 
terrorism-related information and conducting follow-up investigations results from 
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Georgia’s Antiterrorism Act, which was passed years before 9/11 to specifically address 
terrorist threats and illegal acts committed by domestic groups.  The Act provides for the 
development and evaluation of intelligence about persons engaged in terrorist activities, 
the investigation of acts of terrorism and collaboration with other agencies engaged in 
counter terrorism activities. 
28 CFR Part 23 is the underpinning for all activities in the GISAC.  For example, 
information that may be terrorist related is secured in a “tip file.”  If a review of the 
information determines that additional investigation is warranted, officials open a 
“preliminary file” and begin documenting the use of that information, as required by the 
regulation.  GISAC purges its files every 24 months unless the information is related to 
an ongoing investigation.    
The National Governor’s Association, Centers for Best Practice recognized 
GISAC for their efforts in establishing a fusion center:  
Various Georgia state agencies provide personnel for GISAC and the 
center’s analysts and investigators have FBI expertise at their disposal.  
The single state office, in close proximity to federal agencies, provides 
fast and coordinated and cross-communication.  …As information is 
received, it is filtered, documented, and evaluated by analysts.  The 
intelligence product is forwarded to partner agencies, which review it in 
the context of their particular areas of interest and responsibility.  Those 
agencies may recommend certain actions to disrupt or prevent possible 
terrorist attacks or to mitigate and manage the consequences of an attack.  
Agents from GISAC’s partners conduct follow-up investigations to 
determine the credibility, accuracy, and relevancy of current intelligence 
and to gather additional information.  During those investigations, if 
GISAC agents uncover additional threat intelligence, they alert the 
appropriate agencies to prevent or disrupt terrorist activity.  (National 
Governor’s Association Center for Best Practices [NGA], 2005) 
In order to ensure that privacy and civil liberty protections for its citizens were 
addressed, recognized and adhered to, the GBI Investigation Division developed a 
“Criminal Intelligence Operations and Privacy Protections” directive in 2008.  The 
purpose of the 17-page directive is “To outline operating procedures and privacy 
protections for criminal intelligence systems maintained by the Georgia Bureau of 
Investigation [GBI] and define other operational capabilities of the GBI Intelligence 
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Unit” (GBI, 2008).  The directive states GISAC will comply with the requirements of 
Title 28, Part 23 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the National Criminal Intelligence 
Sharing Plan and other relevant federal and state laws regarding criminal intelligence 
information in Georgia. 
The directive clearly defines terms used in the policy, describes how the criminal 
intelligence system operates; how requests for information are handled; the evaluation 
and classification of information and the analysis, dissemination, retention and security 
safeguards of information.  The establishment of a Privacy Officer to serve as the security 
officer is to ensure that information is handled appropriately by providing training, an 
annual audit and outlines how a user will be dealt with if there is misuse of information 
within the GISAC.  A search conducted on the ACLU of Georgia Web site did not 
produce any results regarding GISAC, GEMA or GOHS. 
A review of the relevant federal guidance for fusion center privacy and civil 
liberties policy reveals that the GISAC adheres to the “Fair Information Practices,” 28 
CFR Part 23. It appears that the ‘issues for consideration’ in the Fusion Center Guidelines 
document were incorporated, as was the Information Sharing Environment.  The Baseline 
Capabilities guidance was developed after the last revision of the GBI Directive; 
however, it appears the directive complies with the information outlined in that later 
guidance.  
B. COMMONWEALTH (MASSACHUSETTS) FUSION CENTER 
The Massachusetts State Homeland Security Strategy established the 
Commonwealth Fusion Center (CFC) in October 2004 as the state’s principal center for 
information collection and dissemination.  It was later codified by then Governor Mitt 
Romney when he signed Executive Order 476 in January 2007.  According to the CFC 
Web site: “The Commonwealth Fusion Center collects and analyzes information from all 
available sources to produce and disseminate actionable intelligence to stakeholder for 
strategic and tactical decision-making in order to disrupt domestic and international 
terrorism”  (Commonwealth Fusion Center, n.d.).  CFC is an all-threat, all-crime fusion 
center that encompasses criminal and counter-terrorism analytical support functions.  
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CFC supports the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency as necessary in 
responding to all-hazard incidents that occur within the Commonwealth.  
A 2007 GAO report stated: 
CFC works with various federal and state and agencies including FBI, 
ICE, U.S. Coast Guard, HIDTA, Secret Service, TSA, ATF, the United 
States Marshals Service, U.S. Attorney’s Office, the Massachusetts 
Emergency Management Agency, Massachusetts Department of Fire 
Services, Department of Public Health, Department of Corrections, and 
the National Guard.  There are 15 analysts assigned to CFC, the majority 
of who are Massachusetts State Police employees.  However, officials said 
that four of these analysts are assigned to other duties, such as the Crime 
Reporting Unit or security officer or are otherwise engaged.  The 
Department of Corrections and the Army National Guard have also each 
assigned an analyst to CFC.  All analysts and most sworn members’ 
officers of CFC have Secret clearances, and a few sworn members have 
Top Secret clearances.  The FBI has assigned both an intelligence analyst 
and special agent to CFC, and DHS has assigned an intelligence officer to 
the center.  
CFC also possesses an investigative component through the Massachusetts 
State Police Criminal Intelligence Section that provides 5 state troopers 
and the Massachusetts JTTF, which has 11 state troopers in Boston and 
Springfield, for a total of 16 investigators assigned to CFC.  CFC also has 
a railroad representative and is involved in public/private outreach through 
Project Sentinel, which is a program targeting businesses likely to identify 
precursor terrorist activity.  CFC also has personnel assigned to the Boston 
Regional Intelligence Center, which is the regional intelligence center for 
the Boston/Cambridge Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) region that 
is led by the Boston Police Department. (pp. 78–79) 
The CFC creates four types of intelligence products: bulletins, briefs, report and 
assessments. It also has a network of various stakeholders that receive these various 
products based on the classification of the document (unclassified, sensitive but 
unclassified or law enforcement sensitive) and the stakeholders need-to-know and right-
to-know.  This affords the CFC the ability to continue its investigation, without 
compromising it, yet share information to allow other entities to provide it additional 
information to further that investigation.  Depending upon the classification of the 
product, it could be shared with a wider network of entities thus creating the potential for 
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information from many sources to aid in their investigation.  When CFC produces a 
bulletin, it is widely distributed to get the information out in a timely manner to alert 
stakeholders of an imminent event/situation or to provide for their safety. Additionally, it 
utilizes Geographic Information Systems to enhance products to its customers. 
Massachusetts officials reviewed their legislative requirements after 9/11 and 
conducted a review of existing statutes to determine what laws were applicable to the 
current counter-terrorism effort and what additional legislation was necessary to protect 
the public welfare and provide for security against terrorist acts.  After that review, the 
Legislature passed a series of laws that addressed issues associated with the use of hoax 
substances, the possession of weapons at airports, limitations on public access to sensitive 
infrastructure data, criminalizing unauthorized possession of explosives and the 
use/possession of biological and/or chemical weapons and criminalizing the 
communication of terrorist threats in various media.  During the development of the anti-
terrorism laws, there was a constant focus on ensuring that basic civil liberties were not 
weakened within the state.   
Since its inception, the ACLU of Massachusetts has consistently challenged the 
CFCs role and activities.  Massachusetts ALCU, Executive Director, Carol Rose stated: 
“We need a lot more information about what precisely the fusion center will do, what 
information they will be collecting, who will have access to the information, and what 
safeguards will be put in place to prevent abuse” (ACLU, 2005). Rose also stated: “The 
need for transparency and accountability of these centers is paramount … It is time for 
Massachusetts to develop public oversight of the Fusion Center, including privacy 
standards and an annual public evaluation by an independent person or body...” (ALCU 
MA, 2007).  
In 2006, the CFC instituted the “Commonwealth Fusion Center Privacy Policy,” 
its purpose is “...to ensure safeguards and sanctions are in place to protect personal 
information as information and intelligence are developed and exchanged.  It is the policy 
of the CFC to protect the legitimate privacy concerns of citizens while conducting its 
mission.”  (Commonwealth Fusion Center [CFC], 2006). 
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Figure 6 outlines the flow of information handling and evaluation performed at 
the CFC: 
 
Figure 6.   CFC Information Flow (From CFC Operations Manual, 2006) 
For clarification purposes on Figure 6, the chart above, PIIR stands for Priority 
Information/Intelligence Requirements, which are the details of what a customer needs 
from the intelligence function (CFC, 2006b).  The CFC met with stakeholders to discuss 
various types of information/intelligence they would like to receive. From this, CFC staff 
members have developed a process to analyze and synthesis that for their customers in 
terms of the various products CFC creates and distributes. 
In reviewing the CFC Privacy Policy, it appears that CFC followed the outline of 
the “Fusion Center Model Privacy Policy” in Appendix D and adopted the eight privacy 
design principles of the “Fair Information Practices.”  CFC’s policy contains sections on 
collection limitation, data quality, use limitation, security safeguards, openness, 
participating agency responsibilities and accountability. It also outlines the 
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responsibilities of a Compliance Officer who will conduct audits and investigate the 
misuse of data.  References outlined in the policy indicate 28 CFR Part 23 was utilized in 
the development of the policy. 
One area not outlined in the CFC privacy policy is that of an oversight committee 
which would align them with the ISE Privacy Guidelines – Section 12.  However, in the 
CFC’s “Operations Manual” dated June 2006, it describes the Commonwealth Fusion 
Center Advisory Council and that it will amongst other things “provide leadership on 
collection management goals” (CFC, 2006b).  It is unclear to this author whether this 
involves any privacy oversight responsibilities or not.  The CFCs 50-page Operations 
Manual delineates goals, objectives and the operating environment for information 
sharing and analysis for the state.  CFC also developed other SOPs for the center that 
include, but are not limited to its “National Standards of Intelligence Sharing” and 
“Processing of Tips and Leads.” 
CFC may want to consider producing an annual report on its activities that could 
be shared with the Legislature, state and local government entities, as well as the 
Massachusetts ACLU.  This would help to reinforce CFC’s goal of protecting privacy 
and civil liberties while balancing the safety of the citizens of Massachusetts from bad 
people that may be trying to do bad things within the Commonwealth with less than good 
intentions. 
The Massachusetts Legislature is currently engaged in debate on Senate Bill 931 
(SB931) introduced as “An Act Regarding the Commonwealth Fusion Center and Other 
Intelligence Data Centers” (Chandler, 2009).  If passed, it will prohibit law enforcement 
from collecting information about individuals’ political and religious views, associations 
or activities, unless it relates directly to a criminal investigation based on reasonable 
suspicion of criminal conduct.  The Bill will create an office of data protection and 
privacy oversight for all intelligence data centers in Massachusetts.  A commissioner who 
will have full access and subpoena power in order to enable the office to investigate and 
analyze intelligence data center operations, which includes reports to the public on its 
findings, will lead this office.  The Bill will require basic privacy and quality controls on 
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data and allow for individuals to access, review and correct information concerning them 
in order to ensure data accuracy and reliability. 
The Massachusetts ACLU fully supports the passage of Senate Bill 931.  It 
surmises that fusion centers collect and compile personal information from an array of 
public and private electronic sources, operate with very little independent oversight, do 
not conduct compliance audits and have no quality controls in place.  It also believes that 
SB931 will afford the accountability and oversight that is necessary to protect 
individual’s civil liberty rights and freedoms (American Civil Liberties Union 
Massachusetts [ACLU MA], 2009). 
Carol Rose, Executive Director of ACLU of Massachusetts stated that the CFC 
“…secretly monitor and collect data on virtually every aspect of our daily lives”  and 
“deploying state and local law enforcement officers as surrogates for federal surveillance 
efforts” (ACLU MA, 2009).  The ACLU’s biggest concern is oversight and the fact that 
other Massachusetts law enforcement agencies were established by statute, yet the CFC 
was created only by Executive Order (Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2007).  It feels 
that both the ACLU and the public were left out of the process, which has created anxiety 
over the activities it perceives are taking place within the CFC.  In supporting the passage 
of SB931, the ACLU feels that Legislative monitoring and the creation of strict standards 
for data collection, use, accuracy and operational oversight will provide Massachusetts 
citizens with the protections they inherently deserve.   
CFC could perhaps enhance its standing with the ACLU, and others, by providing 
more transparency in its operations in sharing what it does, how it does what it does and 
providing documentation of such in a more proactive manner than it has over the past 
five years. This could be as easy as producing an annual report.  In the post 9/11 world, 
fusion centers need to be seen as credible by advocacy groups, the public as well as by 
their stakeholders.  The more transparent government can be at all levels for ensuring 
civil liberty protections through such actions as the development of a fully vetted privacy 
policy, staff trained on privacy issues, procedures and policies and the continued 
marketing and outreach of fusion centers, the more they will be understood and valued 
for their mission and purpose—in any state. 
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Juliette N. Kayyem, Massachusetts Undersecretary for Homeland Security, 
testified in April 2008 on the first five years of fusion centers and the CFCs progress.  
She stated: 
Just as Hurricane Katrina painfully taught us that a Department solely 
focused on terrorism may be at risk of undervaluing threats brought by 
mother nature, a state homeland security apparatus not aligned with the 
daily need of public safety entities or first responders could not survive or 
remain relevant.  …The balance at the CFC and in the state we are trying 
to achieve now has made us reexamine our effort, our policies, and our 
transparency.  …We will ensure that we will take the proper steps to 
protect privacy and civil liberties, while continuing to utilize the 
mechanisms of intelligence and analysis that help protect citizens from 
critical incidents.  (Kayyem, 2008) 
Lisa Palmieri, DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis Intelligence Officer and 
assigned to the Commonwealth Fusion Center in Massachusetts, stated, “It’s about the 
flow of information up to the federal government, but also from the government to the 
state and local level and creates a network to link everyone together and across states” 
(Stelter, 2009). The growth and refinement of these centers has helped connect agencies, 
both public and private, across state lines.  Palmieri also stated, “We’ve made a lot of 
progress on information sharing and intelligence sharing” (Stelter, 2009). 
C. ARIZONA COUNTER TERRORISM INFORMATION CENTER 
The Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (AcTIC) was operational in 
October 2004 as a “cross-jurisdictional partnership among local, state and federal law 
enforcement; first responders; and emergency management” (GAO, 2007).  According to 
the Arizona Department of Public Safety’s Web site: “The mission of the Arizona 
Counter Terrorism Information Center is to protect the citizens and critical infrastructures 
of Arizona by enhancing and coordinating counter terrorism intelligence and other 
investigative support efforts among local, state and federal law enforcement agencies.” 
(Arizona Department of Public Safety [AZDPS], 2008).   
AcTIC is an all-crimes fusion center that encompasses an investigative, 
intelligence and analytic support processes for its 24-hour, 7-day a week operation that is 
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collaboratively managed by the Arizona Department of Homeland Security and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation.  The center has 24 state, local and federal agencies 
represented (GAO, 2007). 
There are over 200 investigators, analysts and support personnel at the AcTIC, 
with more than half having Secret clearances.  The $5.3 million dollar, 61,000 square foot 
facility in north Phoenix, is also home to the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) squad, the 
HAZMAT/Weapons of Mass Destruction unit, a computer forensics laboratory, the 
Criminal Investigations Research Unit, Geographical Information Systems and the 
Violent Criminal Apprehension Program.  The facility has workspace for 282 people in 
two suites.  Federal, state and local officials share 157 workstations in one suite while the 
FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force and Field Intelligence Group have 125 workstations in 
an adjacent suite.  This affords both groups with the ability to discuss information, cases, 
tips and such simply by walking to the other’s work area.  Sharing is predicated upon 
trust between two (or more) entities and is nurtured through interpersonal communication 
(NGA, 2005). The co-location of these units is ideal in building the trust between the two 
main providers and consumers of intelligence information in the AcTIC.   
The AcTIC has oversight from two entities: one is a Management Board that 
consists of the executive from each represented agency; the other is the Governor’s 
Executive Oversight Committee.  The oversight committee was created by Executive 
Order 2005-22, signed by then Governor Napolitano, in 2005. It provides guidance and 
assurance that the AcTIC operates efficiently and achieves its responsibilities.  Arizona 
also has a Statewide Information Security and Privacy Office, which serves as the 
strategic planning, facilitation and coordination office for ensuring adequate controls and 
safeguards are in place for information technology systems and business practices 
throughout the State.  These three entities serve as a check and balance for the AcTIC and 
are able to recommend changes to the state’s Homeland Security Director for changes as 
deemed appropriate to ensure they meet their mission within the confines of the laws 
which regulate the AcTIC.   
Information/intelligence is received by the AcTICs Watch Center through various 
sources which is vetted through a series of informational processes before an actionable 
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intelligence product is released to stakeholders.  The dissemination of a product is based 
upon its security classification and the entities need and right-to-know.  Figure 7 
illustrates the flow of information through the AcTIC:   
 
Figure 7.   AcTIC Information Flow (From Forsyth, 2005) 
In a 2007 GAO report: 
AcTIC concentrates on an all-crimes focus for gathering information, 
which is collected from a variety of Web sites; federal, state, and local 
databases and networks; the media; and unclassified intelligence bulletins.  
DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the center 
include LEO Special Interest Groups, HSIN-Intel, HSIN-Intel Arizona, 
and HSDN.  AcTIC has direct connectivity to FBI classified systems and 
networks.  However, those AcTIC personnel with Top Secret clearances 
must enter the JTTF suite and access an FBI system.  AcTIC has access to, 
among others, Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) Automated 
Trusted Information Exchange (ATIX), SIPRNet, the National Criminal 
Information Center (NCIC), International Criminal Police Organization 
(INTERPOL), Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), and El 
Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC).  In total, AcTIC has over 100 law 
enforcement and public source databases available to it.  AcTIC produces 
biweekly intelligence briefings, advisories, citizens’ bulletins, information 
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collection requirement bulletins, information bulletins, intelligence 
bulletins, and threat assessments.  These products are primarily created for 
law enforcement entities and specific community partners, but some are 
for the public (e.g., advisories and citizens’ bulletins).   
The AcTIC established its Privacy Policy in February 2008 in order to 
“…provide, in detail, the AcTIC privacy and civil rights protection framework for AcTIC 
operations” and “…guidance to all AcTIC personnel on the collection, retention and 
dissemination of criminal information, suspect information and victim information to 
protect the privacy rights and privileges of Arizona’s citizens”  (AZDPS, 2008b). The 
six-page policy outlines the AcTICs governance, oversight and procedures for collection 
management, data fusion, disclosure, retention and destruction, accountability, 
enforcement and training.  The AcTIC policy incorporated the eight Privacy Design 
Principles throughout the document as is suggested in DOJ and DHS guidance 
documents. 
The resource list in Appendix A of the DOJ/DHS policy offers a wealth of 
information that they utilized in the development of their privacy policy.  This also 
allows for easy access and referral to policy-makers and advocates alike to those 
documents if there are questions.  The AcTIC also developed a 27-page “Privacy and 
Civil Rights Procedure Guide” that outlines procedures for personnel working in the 
AcTIC to follow well-established policies, procedures, regulations and laws in order to 
ensure the eight and privacy of Arizona’s citizens (AZDPS, 2008a).  This document is 
resource rich and provides employees with significant information as well as training 
opportunities to further their knowledge in this subject area. 
In reviewing the AcTIC privacy policy against federal guidance, it illustrates 
adherence to the Fusion Center Guidelines, Baseline Capabilities, CFR 28 Part 23 and the 
ISE.  AcTIC is one of the most well regarded of fusion centers in the nation by many in 
the intelligence community.  This is due in part to its transparency and operational 
diligence in ensuring privacy and civil liberty policies and procedures are adhered to on a 
daily basis.   
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D. CONSEQUENCES AND RAMIFICATIONS  
The consequences and ramifications for fusion centers that do not focus on 
privacy and civil liberty issues could be potentially detrimental to the fusion center’s 
existence.  Privacy advocates, such as the ACLU and EPIC, government entities, such as 
the Government Accountability Office and Congressional Research Service, and several 
news sources have documented fusion centers’ exploitation of information and 
intelligence in methods that are inappropriate and, in some instances, have violated 
federal and/or state privacy laws and/or statutes.  Fusion centers that do not acknowledge, 
adhere to, or persistently ensure that privacy policies are adhered to, expose themselves 
to unintentional consequences such as a reduction in capability, over-burdensome 
oversight, the potential for reduction in funds and resources, a withdrawal of 
stakeholders, civil lawsuits, loss of credibility, political pressure and the potential 
shuttering of the center, amongst other possible difficulties.   
Centers that do not have a privacy policy, or do not adhere to one, have the 
potential of being excluded from the larger information-sharing network.  The lack of a 
policy could preclude other states, as well as the federal government, which have privacy 
policies, from sharing information based on their laws and statues regarding the 
information-sharing environment.  If a policy does not spell out specific procedures such 
as, what information the center will collect, how the center protects that information (i.e., 
28 CFR Part 23), who has access to the information and such, it could also prevent the 
sharing of information between entities.  For example, a center’s policy could state that if 
another center lacks clearly defined procedures in specific areas (like those 
aforementioned), then that center will not participate in the information-sharing network 
with the center that lacks the policy.   
Law enforcement investigations rely on protections afforded to them by federal 
and state laws and statutes, which could include a privacy policy.  A privacy policy adds 
further integrity that data or information will not be shared in-appropriately thus causing  
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an ongoing investigation to be compromised.  Furthermore, most federal agencies will 
not share or send a representative to a fusion center that does not have a privacy policy; 
this is for their protection as well. 
A center that does not adhere to a privacy policy may be subject to a civil law suit 
if there is mishandling of personally identifiable information.  If a center developed a 
policy and deviated from that policy by sharing information, the defense will use that 
deviation in policy against the center in a lawsuit to illustrate injury in the legal sense.   
The Federal Privacy Act of 1974 regulates what personal information the federal 
government can collect about private individuals and how that information can be used.  
The Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act both provide a legal process for 
accessing personal information.  There are exemptions under the both acts that protect 
information that pertains to national security, criminal investigations or records that 
might identify an agency's source of confidential information.  Although these both have 
exemptions, fusion centers should not solely rely on them to protect the way they collect, 
retain and disseminate information.   
There are also state laws that pertain to the public accessing information collected 
by the state on individuals; in New Hampshire, it is RSA 91-A.  If a center does not 
adhere to the ‘mission’ for which it was created, it exposes itself to possible violations of 
laws and statutes both at state and federal levels.  For example, an all-crime center would 
not have within its mission to collect information on individuals who may be crossing a 
state or national border unless it had a criminal predicate to do so; to collect that 
information on a random basis violates the constitution as well as other possible state and 
federal laws. 
It is important for fusion centers to provide training on privacy and civil liberties 
for all entities associated with the center on a consistent and constant basis.  Personnel 
need to know how to handle protected individual information responsibly and 
consistently within applicable laws/statutes, how to identify when privacy incidents occur 
and how to rectify them.  Documentation of training is important to provide for audits 
and annual reports to demonstrate compliance with privacy policy procedures and federal 
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guidance on training for center personnel on this topic.  If a center cannot provide this 
type of documentation it further erodes its credibility to ensuring a sound privacy policy 
is in place and being adhered to. Thus lack of documentation could also be used against it 
in a civil law suit.  
By designating a privacy/compliance officer, fusion centers ensure that there is a 
dedicated position responsible for coordinating audits and investigating any misuse of 
data, information and intelligence.  There should be a review of all products by this 
position to identify possible privacy-related concerns before distribution.  Without this 
position, center’s risk the possibility that products could be distributed that contain 
information that is wrong or inappropriate.  There have been cases of fusion centers 
distributing products that included personally identifiable information that was later 
found to be inaccurate. Consequently, this resulted in the loss of jobs and the center 
suffering the loss of its credibility with stakeholders, privacy advocates, citizens and the 
information-sharing environment as a whole which results in over-burdensome oversight 
for that center. 
The consequences and ramifications noted above are not all-inclusive but give a 
flavor of what some of the possibilities could be for fusion centers that do not fully 
address and adhere to a privacy policy.  A privacy policy protects individual personally 
identifiable information as well as the disciplines sharing that information.  
E. SUMMING IT UP 
The three privacy policies reviewed herein are indeed unique to their particular 
state.  The Georgia, Arizona and Massachusetts fusion center officials all seem to follow 
the myriad of federal guidance to develop a privacy policy in keeping with their center’s 
identified needs.  Each fusion center, not just these three, is very different in its focus, 
governance structure, funding, etc. In addition, each center is subject to its own unique 
combination of state and federal laws governing intelligence information collection, 
handling, analysis, dissemination and retention. 
In reviewing the CFC’s policy, it adhered to the model privacy policy (see 
Appendix D) which kept its privacy policy short, on point and covered essential elements 
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described in federal guidance documents that have been presented in this thesis.  CFC 
references are limited to the Fair Information Practices and 28 CFR Part 23. 
The AcTIC’s privacy policy took a different approach yet covered many of the 
same basic elements as the CFC’s policy.  AcTIC officials felt it was important for their 
policy to include their governance and oversight structure and a small piece on training. 
The GISAC privacy policy took yet a different approach than the CFC and AcTIC 
policies.  Its policy was more inclusive of other types of information such as definitions, 
which enables the reader to know the terms as applied to GISAC.   
There are similarities among the three policies: they start out with a purpose 
statement; they outline applicability and/or accountability; the role of the privacy officer 
and they all follow the eight privacy design principles (although not the exact wording, 
except for CFC) as essential functions of their privacy policy.  GISAC has a section on 
training, as does AcTIC; however, CFC’s policy does not, other than in the FIP section.  
AcTIC and GISAC specifically utilize 28 CFR Part 23 in their policy, whereas CFC 
utilizes it as a reference.   
While each of the states’ policies differ in structure and form, the underlying 
concept of the protection of privacy and civil liberties for their citizens is evident by 
virtue of the existence of a privacy policy.  Each state has had to endure varying levels of 
criticism of its policy, not only from within its own structure and organization but by 
politicians, legal counsel and privacy advocates who challenge it, sometimes, on a 
continuous basis.   
While challenges are good in a democratic society to ensuring fairness and 
openness, there also has to be recognition by those challenging the policies that (some) 
information must be protected to ensure that at every level of government the dots are 
being connected to prevent bad people from doing bad things in the United States.  It is 
impossible for a privacy policy to conceive of every imaginable situation or set of 
circumstances that a fusion center may encounter.  However, the policy should identify 
the decision points within the intelligence process and provide guidance and structure for 
those decision points. 
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Each entity brings to the fusion center its own functions and resources; however, 
by coalescing their specialties, they are able to achieve the centers identified mission 
more economically.  Working independently they probably would not come up with same 
outcome, as there are simply not enough resources available to do the work efficiently 
and effectively.  By utilizing a team approach, it affords the center the opportunity to 
reduce redundancy, utilize scarce resources in an efficient manner, focus on common 
objectives and build sustainability and credibility with stakeholders.  All disciplines, at all 
levels of government, need to forget their difficulties and differences to work together.  
For fusion centers to be truly successful multi-disciplinary partnerships, it is essential that 
there is a two-way flow of information, both vertically and horizontally.  A one-sided 
approach, by any level of government, will not be successful as was unfortunately 
discovered on 9/11. 
Adherence to established policies and standards will increase the quality of 
information sharing within the fusion center, with other fusion centers, with the federal 
intelligence community and the information sharing environment as a whole.  The 
creation and utilization of a national privacy framework would promote a consistent 
approach to information collection, analysis, dissemination and retention.    
The overarching goals of fusion centers are the same—they want to be proactive 
instead of reactive.  It is an overwhelming responsibility, at any level, to identify what 
information is relevant, when to share it, with whom, under what circumstances, etc.  
Because of the demand for information and the center’s desire for knowledge, the task of 
synthesizing data into actionable intelligence products needs to happen almost 
instantaneously.  Of the fusion centers that are functional today, the majority fall under 
the purview law enforcement; however, law enforcement officials have estimated that 
“approximately 75 percent of the law enforcement agencies in the United States have less 
than 24 sworn officers, and more often than not, these agencies do not have staff 
dedicated to intelligence functions” (Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative 
[Global], 2003, p. iii).  A state fusion center can provide law enforcement agencies, as  
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well as other stakeholders, with vital information to ensure the protection of their 
citizens—whether it is a related to a criminal act, terrorist threat or other hazard that they 
may encounter within their community.   
The concept of ‘boots on the ground (firefighters, police officers, EMS, public 
works, health workers, etc.) armed with validated information from the fusion center, 
allows a keener sense of awareness where various disciplines, not just law enforcement, 
are able to make decisions to further investigate areas that might have gone unnoticed in 
the past.  Just as important, this also provides them the ability to provide 
information/intelligence back to the fusion center to create a bigger picture and possibly 
connect dots about activities within the community and/or state.  For instance, if a fusion 
center produces an information bulletin on meth labs, and fire inspector is doing their job 
and notice items from bulletin, the inspector can alert law enforcement officials.  Or if 
there is information about sabotage of railroad lines, officials can connect with regulatory 
and private sector officials to inform them of the situation so they can mitigate the 
situation as deemed appropriate.   
Law enforcement today is not the same as law enforcement 200 years ago, or 
even 20 years ago. Arguments on the interpretation of laws, guidelines and policies 
between civil rights advocates and government on these issues will likely continue for the 
next 200 years. Carter states, “This is why, civil rights issues for fusion centers have 
components related to policy, training, supervision and public information that must be 
addressed in the development and implementation stages” (2008, p. 24).  If fusion centers 
focus on ensuring privacy, deal with civil liberty issues with upfront and include a multi-
disciplinary committee to review their policies, it would go a long way in building trust 
with all stakeholders.  However, those same stakeholders, citizens and privacy advocates 
must be cognizant of the fact that they are also the ones that hold the fusions centers 
responsible for ensuring their safety. If something goes terribly wrong, they will be the 
ones to lay blame for centers not doing their job.  It is a constant balance that is necessary 
when it comes to information sharing, how much privacy are citizens are willing to give 
up in order to satisfy their need for security.   
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Civil rights are the rights and freedoms that every citizen possesses as outlined in 
the U.S. Constitution.  A fundamental commitment to protecting civil rights should be the 
guiding principle in a fusion center’s privacy policy.  As with any project, there needs to 
be vision, energy and commitment for it to succeed.  Bringing in stakeholders and 
constituents early on in the development process builds a system of mutual trust and 
support.  There must be commitment and resolve for ensuring sound policies, 
comprehensive training, effective systems for accountability and supervision are 
instituted appropriately within fusion centers.  It is imperative that if there is a breach of 
citizen’s civil rights that it be acted upon and corrective action taken immediately.  This 
must be done so as not to erode trust and credibility of the center with its stakeholders as 
well as with advocacy groups.   
As noted earlier, the consequences and ramifications are far too reaching for 
fusion centers to ignore the importance of developing, training on and adhering to a 
privacy policy. 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
When it comes to privacy and accountability, people always demand the 
former 
 —David Brin, American science fiction writer 
Before making recommendations for developing a privacy policy for the New 
Hampshire Information and Analysis Center, there are many things to take into 
consideration:   
 What types of information will be collected?  
 Who will analyze it?  
 Who will develop a product?  
 Who decides if there is a product?  
 What type of product will it be, is it classified, 
 Who is audience?  
 Is it urgent, or can it wait?  
 Who approves the product?  
 What is the dissemination method?  
 What governs these? 
These and many more decisions that must be made on a daily basis for the fusion 
center.  These are all basic questions that merely skim the tip of the iceberg as far as 
privacy and civil liberty protections are concerned.  There is much thought needed for 
developing a privacy policy, it requires much more than simply throwing words on paper 
and announcing its existence—the consequences and ramifications are far to immense. 
While information sharing is a controversial topic, it is crucial to ensuring the 
nation’s security.  There are federal and state laws that provide protections for citizens 
from infringement of personal information.  A continuous balance must be kept in order  
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to secure both the privacy and security of U.S. citizens and the nation.  Fusion centers can 
be the underpinnings to that balance if set up with appropriate safeguards, checks and 
balances and oversight. 
The following privacy policy recommendations may provide a forum for 
discussions at higher levels of government, on the applicability of a national privacy 
framework that promotes a consistent approach to information collection, analysis, 
dissemination and retention.  The challenge for the federal government, in collaboration 
with the states, will be how to implement a coordinated approach for privacy policies in 
consideration of the fact that there are already over 70 fusion centers in various stages of 
operation (DHS, n.d.). 
All levels of government need to clearly understand the importance of 
institutionalized and systematic protections to privacy and civil liberties for the continued 
success of fusion centers.  How to get there is the topic for another thesis.   
A. WHAT IS A PRIVACY POLICY? 
The definition of a privacy policy by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Policy Development Guide and Implementation Templates:   
A privacy policy is a written, published statement that articulates the 
policy position of an organization on how it handles the personally 
identifiable information that it gathers and uses in the normal course of 
business.  The policy should include information relating to the processes 
of information collection, analysis, maintenance, dissemination, and 
access.  The purpose of the privacy policy is to articulate that the agency 
will adhere to those legal requirements and agency policy determinations 
that enable gathering and sharing of information to occur in a manner that 
protects personal privacy interests.  A well-developed and –implemented 
privacy policy uses justice entity resources wisely and effectively; protects 
the agency, the individual, and the public; and promotes public trust. 
(Global, 2008b, p. E–7.) 
A security policy is different from a privacy policy in that a security policy may 
not adequately address the protection of personally identifiable information as a privacy 
policy does.  Security policies focus on information classification, protection and a  
 
   59 
 
review process for ensuring information is handled in accordance with the fusion center’s 
privacy policy.  Privacy protection is only meaningful if it exists within with a resilient 
security system. 
It is important for fusion centers to develop and implement a privacy policy for 
the reason succinctly stated in the Privacy Impact Assessment for the Department of 
Homeland Security State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative:  
A well written privacy policy will force fusion centers to examine and 
document their legal authorities for undertaking various activities.  It will 
then become the standard to which they train and hold their employees.  
This will significantly reduce the likelihood that centers will use their 
powers inconsistent with their authorities. (DHS, 2008, p. 28) 
An important facet of the fusion center is to ensure transparency throughout its 
operation.  An annual report and/or a privacy impact assessment—similar to those that 
DHS compiles—would be a useful tool to provide the center’s leadership, stakeholders, 
privacy advocates and the public with full and open disclosure of the centers activities 
with regard to privacy and civil liberty issues that it dealt with. 
B. PRIVACY BENCHMARKS 
In promoting fusion centers achieve a baseline level of capability, the National 
Strategy for Information Sharing states, “The federal government will support the 
establishment of these centers and help sustain them through grant funding, technical 
assistance, and training to achieve a baseline level of capability and to help ensure 
compliance with all applicable privacy laws” (White House, 2007 p. 20).  The strategy 
outlines specific roles and responsibilities for federal, state, local and tribal authorities in 
five areas that are related to the establishment and continued operations of fusion centers 
and for establishing a network of interconnected centers.  The areas include:  
 General;  
 Achieving and sustaining baseline operational standards for state and 
major urban area fusion centers;  
 Suspicious activities and incident reporting;  
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 Alerts, warnings and notification; and  
 Situational awareness reporting.   
As the items are addressed in each area, it creates pieces of the governance 
structure, privacy policy, operational plan and products, amongst other tasks that 
uniformly relate to all fusion centers.  The strategy indicates that the roles and 
responsibilities were developed in partnership with state and local officials and represent 
a collective view of the fusion process.  While the strategy acknowledges that fusion 
centers are owned and managed by state and local governments, it identifies the objective 
is to assist state and local governments in the establishment and sustained operation of 
these centers.  Some fusion center officials have raised concerns at the lack of specificity 
to-date from the federal government on how it will actually carry out that objective.  
Most fusion centers do not have the capacity to financially sustain themselves; nor do 
they have the resources (equipment and personnel) needed to sustain operations without 
assistance from the federal government.  Continued funding, training and technical 
assistance are essential for sustainability. 
Eileen R. Larence, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, stated:  
Although fusion centers were primarily established to meet or enhance 
information sharing within a state or local area, they have become a 
critical component of the federal government’s plans as it works to 
improve information sharing in accordance with law and policy.  Indeed, 
the National Strategy recognizes fusion centers as vital assets to 
information sharing and critical in the creation of an integrated national 
network to promote two-way sharing of terrorism-related information.  
…The National Strategy clearly articulates a vision for the federal 
government’s role in supporting centers—that is by helping to sustain 
centers through grant funding, technical assistance, and training.  (GAO, 
2008, p. 15.)  
The Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, 
Information Privacy Protections section, outlines five specific areas that fusion centers 
need to address to ensure a legally sound privacy policy is established:  
 Designate a privacy official;  
 Develop the privacy policy;  
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 Address civil liberty and legal rights;  
 Conduct outreach and training; and  
 Accountability.  (DOJ & DHS, 2008) 
Appendix A is a spreadsheet that further illustrates the Information Privacy 
Protections in a manner that allows states to document their progress for each of 
items/tasks in the baseline document.  Additionally, the spreadsheet contains a crosswalk 
to the Target Capabilities List (TCL), National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan 
(NCISP), Fusion Center Guidelines (FCG) and the National Strategy for Information 
Sharing (NSIS) with the appropriate section/guide to ensure further compliance with 
federal guidance (DHS, 2007). The TCL describes 37 capabilities related to the four 
homeland security mission areas of prevent, protect, respond and recover and define and 
provide the basis for assessing preparedness at all levels of government (DHS, 2007). 
The NCISP outlines steps that law enforcement agencies at all levels can utilize to ensure 
that effective intelligence sharing is institutionalized across the law enforcement 
community.  The FCGs ensure centers are established and operated consistently, resulting 
in enhanced coordination efforts, strengthened partnerships and improved capabilities.  
The NSIS establishes an integrated information sharing capability to ensure that those 
who need information will receive it and those who have it will share it. 
In many cases, the privacy baseline capabilities exceed the requirements of the 
ISE Privacy Guidelines, because fusion centers address information types and activities 
that extend beyond the scope of the ISE (DOJ & DHS, 2008). The ISE is mandated for 
federal government entities but not state or local governments; however, it makes sense 
to achieve this higher capability when working with federal entities.  Moreover, it further 
illustrates a state’s willingness to further its standards and credibility with its 
stakeholders. 
There have been numerous reports and testimony provided to the federal 
government on the status and value of fusion centers as a whole, from government 
officials to advocacy groups and many in between.  With respect to establishing a solid 
foundation for protecting privacy and civil liberties, over the last several years, there have 
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been numerous forums for discussion at various levels to further collaboration and 
transparency.  In 2006, there were four regional fusion center conferences specifically 
focused on the importance of a privacy policy.  In early 2007, the Fusion Center Privacy 
Technical Assistance Program was initiated to assist centers to train personnel on privacy 
policies.  In late 2007, four additional regional fusion center meetings took place where 
fusion center personnel learned the history of privacy and civil liberties in law 
enforcement intelligence and the importance of developing a privacy policy; this was 
repeated in 2009 as well.  The National Fusion Center Conferences (2007–2009) continue 
to provide educational sessions on protecting privacy and civil liberties to highlight the 
importance of these issues and to reinforce the technical assistance sessions offered at the 
regional conferences.  The topic of privacy and civil liberties continues to be an area ripe 
for discussion and debate as is illustrated throughout this paper. 
C. SETTING THE STAGE FOR NEW HAMPSHIRE 
What can be leveraged in the analysis of the three privacy policies reviewed in 
this thesis in creating New Hampshire’s IAC privacy policy, realizing an all-threat, all-
crime and all-hazard focus?  The three fusion center privacy policy’s described herein 
have different origins based upon their particular centers’ identified risks, threats, 
vulnerabilities, laws, statues, constitution, civil liberty provisions, governance and 
funding, hence, the differences in the policies.  New Hampshire also has different needs, 
threats, statutes, etc., which will result in a privacy policy that is as diverse as the three 
reviewed in this thesis. 
It is assumed that the following federal guidance documents were utilized to 
create the basic structure when the centers were established and operationalized:  
 National Strategy for Information Sharing; 
 Fusion Center Guidelines:  Developing and Sharing Information and 
Intelligence in a New Era; 
 Guidelines to Ensure that the Information Privacy and other Legal Rights 
of Americans are Protected in Development and use of the Information 
Sharing Environment; and  
   63 
 
 National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan. 
It is also assumed that the Fusion Center Guidelines (DOJ & DHS, 2007) list of 
things to consider when developing a privacy policy were reviewed and incorporated as 
appropriate.  They include:    
 Adding introductory language that clearly states the privacy practices of 
the center. 
 Describing the information collected and how information is stored.   
 Establishing a common lexicon of terms for dealing with role-based 
access.  Defining and publishing how the information will be used.   
 Drafting a clear, prominent and understandable policy.  
 Avoid communicating in complicated or technical ways.  
 Displaying the privacy policy for both center personnel and customers.   
 Ensuring that all other policies and internal controls are consistent with the 
privacy policy.   
 Establishing a business practice of notifying government agencies of 
suspected inaccurate data.   
 Adhering to applicable state and federal constitutional and statutory civil 
rights provisions.   
 Partnering with training centers on privacy protection requirements and 
conducting periodic privacy security audits.   
 Consulting with a privacy committee (see Guideline 3) to ensure that 
citizens’ privacy and civil rights are protected.   
 When utilizing commercially available databases, ensuring the usage is for 
official business and the information obtained is not commingled with 
private sector data.   
 To prevent public records disclosure, risk and vulnerability assessments 
should not be stored with publicly available data.   
 Determining if there are security breach notification laws within the 
jurisdiction and following those laws, if applicable.  (DOJ & DHS, 2007, 
p. 42) 
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Building upon this planning base, the following recommendations are provided as 
guidance in the creation of a succinct and legally sound privacy policy for the NH IAC, 
or other fusion center at the same point in the process.  By utilizing the following 
recommendations, the policy will address the collection of various types of information, 
as well as how to compile, blend, analyze and disseminate that information without 
infringing upon citizens’ rights:   
 Utilize the “Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion 
Centers, Information Privacy Protections” document (DOJ & DHS, 2008) 
and specifically the Information Privacy Protections as illustrated in 
Appendix A of this thesis. 
 Utilize the “Privacy and Civil Liberties Policy Development Guide and 
Implementation Templates” (Global, 2008b).  This document incorporates 
the Fair Information Practices, which are the accepted baseline for privacy 
protections worldwide. 
 Adhere to applicable state and federal constitutional and statutory privacy, 
civil liberty provisions and right-to-know laws. 
 Mandate privacy and civil liberty training programs for IAC personnel. 
 Adopt and ensure adherence to 28 CFR Part 23. 
 Conduct outreach and provide educational information on the IAC to 
local, state, federal, private sector, legislative and other entities to ensure a 
consistent message is conveyed and understood across the spectrum. 
 Provide open access to the IAC privacy policy and standard operating 
guidelines, as allowed under RSA 91-A. 
 Establish an IAC advisory committee, to include a cross-section of 
stakeholders, to review the center’s operations and to provide advice 
regarding security, privacy, data technology, the protection of civil rights 
and other such matters. 
 Conduct an annual meeting with the IAC Advisory Committee, NH 
Attorney General and representative(s) of a civil liberties organization to 
report on the operation of the center.  This will allow for validation and 
continued input on how to best ensure the protection of civil rights and 
personal privacy in a transparent manner. 
 Consider developing an audit checklist similar to that of the “Audit 
Factors for the Law Enforcement Intelligence Function” (Carter.  2008). 
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 Establish a system to track and resolve privacy complaints, issues or 
concerns. 
 Ensure all fusion center partners comply with all local, state and federal 
privacy laws. 
 Develop a governance structure for the center that includes a cross-section 
of stakeholders, including law enforcement, public safety, public health, 
legal, legislative, private sector and federal entities.   
 Establish committees, as necessary, to help execute, adhere to and 
revise, policies, procedures and programs within the IAC. 
 Oversight Committee—provides review and advice on the 
center as a whole. 
 Executive Committee—set policy, makes critical decisions 
and commits resources. 
 Operational Committee—focuses on specific policies, 
procedures and/or tasks. 
 Technical Committee—focuses on technical standards, 
critical infrastructure operation and security. 
 Develop by-laws. 
 Utilize parliamentary procedures (i.e., Roberts Rules of Order). 
 Develop memoranda of understanding, non-disclosure agreements 
and user agreements with partners, as necessary and appropriate. 
There does not appear to be a “one size fits all” privacy policy that can be utilized 
in every state due to differences in state’s laws, statutes, constitution, civil liberty 
provisions, governance structures, threats, risks, vulnerabilities and funding sources.  
What works for Massachusetts does not work for Georgia or Arizona and vice versa due 
to the aforementioned items.  For example, the right-to-know laws and/or freedom of 
information acts are not the same in the three states that are analyzed herein.  In New 
Hampshire, the right-to-know law (RSA 91-A) allows for the release of all information 
from any department unless it specifically relates to “Records pertaining to matters 
relating to the preparation for and the carrying out of all emergency functions, including 
training to carry out such functions, developed by local or state safety officials that are 
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directly intended to thwart a deliberate act that is intended to result in widespread or  
severe damage to property or widespread injury or loss of life” (C 91-A:5, 2008a).  Each 
state should take into account its own needs and develop a sound policy that will stand up 
to legal review, political rhetoric and advocacy challenges. 
Outreach and education is necessary and needed to inform state and local 
government officials, advocacy groups and other stakeholders on what fusion centers are, 
why they are value-added, to define what products are needed by the various disciplines 
and how the fusion center can be further leveraged by its constituents.  The more fusion 
centers are discussed and people are exposed to their capabilities, both conceptually and 
operationally, the more they will be understood and accepted for what they are—a way to 
connect dots and share information without impinging upon privacy and civil liberties of 
U.S. citizens. 
When developing a privacy policy, a cross-section of various stakeholders should 
be brought into the process because transparency is crucial and input is essential for 
building trust—both horizontally and vertically.  In New Hampshire, the Department of 
Safety worked with representatives in drafting legislation to create the IAC.  This 
collaborative process allowed stakeholders the opportunity to provide input and direction 
to ensure the protection of privacy and civil liberty issues in the state.  Ultimately, the 
legislation did not pass; however, it further strengthened and built consensus and 
understanding on both sides as to what the issues were and how they could be addressed 
through the legislative process.  It has been suggested that the department utilize (some of 
the) language from the legislation to create IAC policies and procedures as they have 
been initially vetted through the legal and legislative process. 
There are many federal documents (see Appendix B) that explore policies, 
resources and organizational issues for states to utilize to develop a privacy policy.  
Although there is a plethora of information on privacy and civil liberty topics, it is not 
easy to navigate through the material in a cohesive and efficient manner.  Instead of a 
“one size fits all” privacy policy that clearly does not work, this author would suggest 
that clear, concise and consistent information be provided.  For states to have a single, 
comprehensive framework to refer to during the development process, instead of 
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traversing between documents and Web sites, it would save time and provide 
consistency.  In the long run, this type of framework could assist in a establishing a 
nationwide privacy policy program.  It is important to note that much has already been 
developed in terms privacy documentation by DHS and DOJ for specific purposes for 
each discipline to include all-crime, all-hazard and counterterrorism.  It simply does not 
make sense from a practical standpoint to have to engage two different federal 
departments to provide technical assistance in the development of a privacy policy when 
many components are overlapping and/or necessary, depending upon the type of center a 
state is developing.  Where is the efficiency? 
As recommended by the various federal documents, each state should create a 
privacy policy that follows its constitution, laws and statues, as well as pertinent federal 
laws, that are based upon relevant threats and risks.  To reiterate, this researcher does not 
believe, based on the research conducted for this thesis, that there can be a one size fits 
all privacy policy developed to address each state’s individual needs and requirements.  
However, the development of a single federal framework that contains such items as: 
 specific guidance; 
 definitions; 
 identification of possible issues; 
 various templates; 
 checklists,  
and alike, would assist states in understanding the magnitude of work, thought, 
collaboration and legal counsel coordination that needs to take place in order to develop 
their own privacy policy that ensures the protection of citizens civil rights.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
A free society is a place where it’s safe to be unpopular. 
 —Adlai E. Stevenson, Jr.  
(U.S. diplomat and Democratic politician) 
The development of a fusion center provides the opportunity to bring together 
essential resources and produce meaningful information and intelligence for distribution 
to the right people at the right time for the right reasons.  There are many hurdles to 
overcome in the process of establishing a fusion center privacy policy; however, utilizing 
the guidance documents developed by the federal government and outlined in this paper 
is a step in the right direction.  Oversight and direction from stakeholders, both inside and 
outside of government, are essential to the success of the center and should be 
encouraged.   
DOJ and DHS have produced numerous guidance documents to assist states in the 
development of a privacy policy for their fusion centers.  The challenge for the federal 
government, in collaboration with states, is to put a square peg in a round hole, meaning 
that there are different governance structures, laws, funding sources, etc. that inhibit each 
state and that coming up with a “one-size fits all” privacy policy may be near to 
impossible.  
As New Hampshire continues to build-out is capabilities for an Information and 
Analysis Center, it would be helpful to have one place to go to for technical assistance 
and guidance on how to create a privacy policy that takes into account all facets of risk, 
threat and vulnerability.  However, it does not seem too likely that will be a possibility in 
the near future due to the complications of designations of all-crime, counter-terrorism 
and all-hazard centers, and the fact that these functions are not coordinated by, or even 
with at times, the same federal departments.  There are multiple federal and state agencies 
that must be involved in order to weave the way through the maze of federal and state 
laws, regulations, polices and guidance documents.  A spreadsheet that clearly illustrates 
the various pieces to the puzzle would be a good starting point.   
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As outlined in the case studies between Georgia, Massachusetts and Arizona, their 
laws and structure simply do not afford any of them the luxury of utilizing the same 
privacy policy.  It is acknowledged that it is vitally important for each state to have a 
privacy policy and operational procedure in place to govern its fusion center’s operations 
on the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence/information to stakeholders.  
It must also be acknowledged that not every conceivable situation will be able to be 
represented in the policy.  States must also create a policy that outlines redress and the 
corrective actions that must take place if information is collected and/or disseminated 
erroneously.  The DHS Office of Information and Analysis will respond to states, upon 
request, to assist in an investigation of misuse of information.  This office assists in 
uncovering what went wrong, at what step of the intelligence process, and help to 
develop appropriate procedures and processes to correct the problem and ensure that it 
does not happen again.  This can be done through corrective measures such as training 
and reinforcement of the procedures with all personnel. 
All elements of society have an interest in protecting and reducing vulnerability to 
terrorist attacks. Including government, private sector and the public in a cooperative 
effort enhances the information sharing process.  Accountability, credibility and 
transparency will be key factors for the success of fusion centers in the future.  There 
needs to be a greater awareness of the value-added that fusion centers bring to the 
intelligence community whether they are all-crime, counter-terrorism or all-hazard 
centers (or any combination thereof). They all bring different things to the table based on 
the state’s particular threats, risks and vulnerabilities. 
There is only one enemy, the one committed to demolishing this nation, therefore 
the U.S. must make the protection of the United States and it citizens’ way of life its 
primary mission.  Fusion centers are an important piece of the puzzle to ensuring the dots 
get connected and keeping U.S. citizens safe from all threats—including the rights 
afforded to them under the United States’ Constitution. 
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APPENDIX A. BASELINE CAPABILITIES—INFORMATION PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 
Table 1.   Baseline Capabilities (From Department of Homeland Security, Intelligence and Analysis, 2009) 
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APPENDIX B. RESOURCES FOR PRIVACY POLICY 
DEVELOPMENT 
Audit Checklist. This checklist was developed by the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit 
(LEIU), in support of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan.  This is a tool that 
can be utilized to conduct an audit/evaluation of an agency’s criminal intelligence 
function. 
 
U.S. Department of Justice. (2004). Audit Checklist for the Criminal Intelligence 
Function.  Washington, DC: author. Retrieved December 6, 2009, from 
http://it.ojp.gov/documents/LEIU_audit_checklist.pdf 
 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers. Developed by 
the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Homeland Security provides a 
section specifically on information privacy protections in a detailed format.  
 
U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2008). Baseline 
Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers A Supplement to the Fusion 
Center Guidelines. Washington, DC: authors. Retrieved December 6, 2009, from 
http://it.ojp.gov/documents/baselinecapabilitiesa.pdf 
 
Fusion Center Guidelines Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a 
New Era. Developed by the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security.  Guideline 8 is dedicated to privacy and civil liberties. 
 
U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2006). Fusion 
Center Guidelines Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era. 
Washington, DC: authors. Retrieved December 6, 2009, from 
http://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_guidelines_law_enforcement.pdf 
 
Justice Information Privacy Guideline. Developed by the National Criminal Justice 
Association this document provides guidance on public safety, public access and privacy for 
the development of information privacy policies. 
 
National Criminal Justice Association. (2002, September)  Justice Information Privacy 




National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan. Developed by the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s (DOJ) Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global) provides a series 




Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. 
Department of Justice. (2003). National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan. Washington, 
DC: Department of Justice. Retrieved December 6, 2009, from 
http://it.ojp.gov/documents/National_Criminal_Intelligence_Sharing_Plan.pdf 
 
Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Policy Templates for Justice Information 
Systems. Developed by the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Global Justice 
Information Sharing Initiative this document provides templates for drafting 
comprehensive policies to protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties principles.  
 
Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Office of Justice Programs, U.S 
Department of Justice. (2008, February).  Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Policy 





Privacy and Civil Liberties Policy Development Guide and Implementation Templates. 
Developed by the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Global Justice Information Sharing 
Initiative (Global), provides information on developing and implementing privacy 
policies.  
 
Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. 
Department of Justice.  (2008, February). Privacy and Civil Liberties Policy Development 
Guide and Implementation Templates. Washington, DC: department of Justice.  
Retrieved December 6, 2009, from 
 http://it.ojp.gov/privacy206/privacy_policy_development_guide.pdf 
 
Privacy and Information Quality Policy Development for the Justice Maker. Developed 
by U.S. Department of Justice’s Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative. The 
document is a quick guide to privacy and information quality policies.  
 
Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. 
Department of Justice. (2008). Privacy and Information Quality Policy Development for 
the Justice Maker. Washington, DC: Department of Justice. Retrieved December 6, 2009, 
from http://it.ojp.gov/documents/global_privacy_brief.pdf 
 
28 CFR Part 23. U.S. Department of Justice.  This is the national standard for sharing 
criminal intelligence information to ensure that criminal intelligence systems conform 
with the privacy and constitutional rights of individuals. 
 
U.S. Department of Justice. (2001). Code of Federal Regulations, Title 28--Judicial 
Administration, Chapter I—Department of Justice, Part 23—Criminal Intelligence 
Systems Operating Policies. Washington, D.C. Retrieved December 6, 2009, from 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_01/28cfr23_01.html  
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APPENDIX C. COMPENDIUM OF NEW HAMPSHIRE’S 
PRIVACY AND SECURITY LEGISLATION 
Table 2.   Compendium of New Hampshire’s Privacy and Security Legislation (From 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2003, pp. 114–115) 
  Category  Citation 
1 State Regulatory Authority  106-B:14 
2 Privacy and Security Council Reg. 7.C, D 
3 Dissemination Regulations   
            Conviction Information   
3.10 Authorizes to Criminal Justice Agencies 
Reg. 3.B.2; Gen. 106-B:14, :14-a; 651-
B:7 
3.11 Authorizes to Govt. Noncriminal Justice Agencies 
170-E:7, -G:8-c; 189:13-a; 328-B:4; 
Reg. 3.B 
3.12 Authorizes to Private Sector 159-C:2; Reg. 3.B 
3.13 Prohibits to Criminal Justice Agencies  159-C:3 
3.14 Prohibits to Govt. Noncriminal Justice Agencies  159-C:3 
3.15 Prohibits to Private Sector  159-C:3 
             Nonconviction Information   
3.20 Authorizes to Criminal Justice Agencies Reg. 3.A.2 
3.21 Authorizes to Govt. Noncriminal Justice Agencies Reg. 3.B.8 
3.22 Authorizes to Private Sector  Reg. 3.B.8 
3.23 Prohibits to Criminal Justice Agencies   
3.24 Prohibits to Govt. Noncriminal Justice Agencies  Reg. 3.B.3 
3.25 Prohibits to Private Sector  Reg. 3.B.3 
             Arrest Information   
3.30 Authorizes to Criminal Justice Agencies Reg. 3.A.2 
3.31 Authorizes to Govt. Noncriminal Justice Agencies Reg. 3.B.8 
3.32 Authorizes to Private Sector Reg. 3.B.8 
3.33 Prohibits to Criminal Justice Agencies   
3.34 Prohibits to Govt. Noncriminal Justice Agencies  Reg. 3.B.3 
3.35 Prohibits to Private Sector Reg. 3.B.3 
4 Inspection   
4.1 Right to Inspect Only   
4.2 Right to Inspect and Take Notes   
4.3 Right to Inspect and Obtain Copy 91-A:4; Reg. 3.B.9 
5 Right to Challenge Reg. 7 
6 Judicial Review of Challenged Information   
7 Purging Nonconviction Information  Reg. 3.D 
8 Purging Conviction Information  651:5; Reg. 3.D 
9 Sealing Nonconviction Information   
10 Sealing Conviction Information  318-B:28-a; 651:5 
11 Removal of Disqualifications 651:5; Reg. 3.D 
12 Right to State Nonexistence of Record  651:05:00 
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  Category  Citation 
13 Research Access  Reg. 3.B.7 
14 Accuracy and Completeness   
14.1 Disposition Reporting Requirements  106-B:14, 14-a 
14.2 Auditing Requirements  Reg. 5 
14.3 Other Accuracy/Completeness Requirements  Reg. 4 
15 Dedication   
16 Civil Remedies   
17 Criminal Penalties  106-B:14; 159-C:10; 651:5.X 
18 Public Records  7-A:1; 91-A:4 
19 Separation of Files   
20 Regulation of Intelligence Collection   
21 Regulation of Intelligence Dissemination   
22 Security   
22.1 Physical (Building) Security  Reg. 1 
22.2 Administrative Security  Reg. 2 
22.3 Computer Security   
23 Transaction Logs  Reg. 3.C.4 
24 Training Employees   
25 Listing of Information Systems  7-A:2 
26 FOIA (Including CJI)   
27 FOIA (Excluding CJI)  91-A:5; 106-B:14 
28 Central State Repository  106-B:14 
29 
National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact 
Enacted 
  
      
  
This Compendium is the latest in a series of 12 U.S. Department of Justice publications that 
reference and analyze State laws and regulations relating to privacy and security of criminal 
history record information.  These compendia include: (1) compilations of State laws and 
administrative regulations, and (2) analyses of findings and trends reflected in that body of law and 
policy documents. The purpose of these compendia is to assist legislators, planners, 
administrators, legal analysts and others interested in reviewing State statutes and regulations 
governing the maintenance and use of criminal records, and in analyzing national trends in this 
important area.  Comparing and contrasting the various approaches reflected in the many State 
laws and regulations cited in these documents should assist planners and administrators in 
developing effective and fair policies for their jurisdictions. By facilitating such comparisons and by 
furthering research in this area, the compendia are intended to promote the evolution of 
enlightened privacy and information policy.  (Compendium of State Security and Privacy 
Legislation: Overview 2002.  2003, November). 
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APPENDIX D. FUSION CENTER MODEL PRIVACY POLICY 
SAMPLE TEMPLATE (FROM FUSION CENTER MODEL, 2004) 
 
This document should only be used as a sample.  The user is encouraged to add 
And delete items contained within this sample document as appropriate. 
 




The ________________________________________________ is a Fusion Center 
(herein referenced to as “Center”) as defined below: 
 
A Fusion Center is a collaborative effort of two of more agencies who 
provide resources, expertise, and/or information to the Center with the 
goal of maximizing the ability to detect, prevent, apprehend, and respond 
to criminal and terrorism activity. 
 
The Fusion Center project was initiated in response to the increased need for timely 
information sharing and exchange of crime-related information among members of the 
law enforcement community.  One component of the Center focuses on the development 
and exchange of criminal intelligence.  This component focuses on the intelligence 
process where information is collected, integrated, evaluated, analyzed and disseminated.   
 
The Center’s intelligence products and services will be made available to law 
enforcement agencies and other criminal justice entities.  All agencies participating in the 
Center will be subject to a Memorandum of Understanding and will be required to adhere 
to all Center policies and security requirements.  The purpose of this privacy policy is to 
ensure safeguards and sanctions are in place to protect personal information as 
information and intelligence are developed and exchanged. 
 
This Privacy Policy embraces the eight Privacy Design Principles developed by the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development’s Fair Information Practices 
and shall be used to guide the policy wherever applicable.  The eight Privacy Design 
Principles are: 
 
1. Purpose Specification―Define agency purposes for information to help ensure 
agency uses of information are appropriate.  
2. Collection Limitation―Limit the collection of personal information to that 
required for the purposes intended. 
3. Data Quality―Ensure data accuracy. 
4. Use Limitation―Ensure appropriate limits on agency use of personal 
information. 
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5. Security Safeguards―Maintain effective security over personal information.  
6. Openness―Promote a general policy of openness about agency practices and 
policies regarding personal information. 
7. Individual Participation―Allow individuals reasonable access and opportunity 
to correct errors in their personal information held by the agency.  
8. Accountability―Identify, train, and hold agency personnel accountable for 
adhering to agency information quality and privacy policies. 
 
The Center has developed databases by using existing data sources from participating 
entities to integrate data with the goal of identifying, developing, and analyzing 
information and intelligence related to terrorist activity and other crimes for investigative 




II. Collection Limitation 
 
The Center is maintained for the purpose of developing information and intelligence by 
agencies participating in the project.  The decision of the agencies to participate in the 
Center and about which databases to provide is voluntary and will be governed by the 
laws and rules governing the individual agencies respecting such data, as well as by 
applicable federal laws. 
 
Because the laws, rules, or policies governing information and intelligence that can be 
collected and released on private individuals will vary from agency to agency, limitations 
on the collection of data concerning individuals is the responsibility of the collector of the 
original source data.  Each contributor of information is to abide by the collection 
limitations applicable to it by reason of law, rule, or policy.  Information contributed to 
the Center should be that which has been collected in conformance with those limitations. 
 
 
III. Data Quality 
 
The agencies participating in the Center remain the owners of the data contributed and 
are, therefore, responsible for the quality and accuracy of the data accessed by the Center.  
Inaccurate personal information can have a damaging impact on the person concerned 
and on the integrity and functional value of the Center.  In order to maintain the integrity 
of the Center, any information obtained through the Center must be independently 
verified with the original source from which the data was extrapolated before any official 
action (e.g., warrant or arrest) is taken.  User agencies and individual users are 
responsible for compliance with respect to use and further dissemination of such 





IV. Use Limitation 
 
Information obtained from or through the Center can only be used for lawful purposes.  A 
lawful purpose means the request for data can be directly linked to a law enforcement 
agency’s active criminal investigation or is a response to a confirmed lead that requires 
follow-up to prevent a criminal act. 
 
The Governance Board of the Fusion Center will take necessary measures to make 
certain that access to the Center’s information and intelligence resources is secure and 
will prevent any unauthorized access or use.  The Board reserves the right to restrict the 
qualifications and number of personnel who will be accessing the Center and to suspend 
or withhold service to any individual violating this Privacy Policy.  The Board, or 
persons acting on behalf of the Board, further reserves the right to conduct inspections 
concerning the proper use and security of the information received from the Center.   
 
Security for information derived from the Center will be provided in accordance with 
applicable laws, rules, and regulations.  Furthermore, all personnel who receive, handle, 
or have access to Center data and/or sensitive information will be trained as to those 
requirements.  All personnel having access to the Center’s data agree to abide by the 
following rules:  
 
1. The Center’s data will be used only to perform official law enforcement 
investigative-related duties in a manner authorized by the user’s employer. 
2. Individual passwords will not be disclosed to any other person except as 
authorized by agency management. 
3. Individual passwords will be changed if authorized personnel of the agency or 
members of the Center suspect the password has been improperly disclosed or 
otherwise compromised. 
4. Background checks will be completed on personnel who will have direct access to 
the Center. 
5. Use of the Center’s data in an unauthorized or illegal manner will subject the user 
to denial of further use of the Center, discipline by the user’s employing agency, 
and/or criminal prosecution. 
 
Each authorized user understands that access to the Center can be denied or rescinded for 
failure to comply with the applicable restrictions and use limitations. 
 
V. Security Safeguards 
 
Information obtained from or through the Center will not be used or publicly disclosed 
for purposes other than those specified in the Memorandum of Understanding that each 
participating agency must sign.  Information cannot be (1) sold, published, exchanged, or 
disclosed for commercial purposes; (2) disclosed or published without prior approval of 
the contributing agency; or (3) disseminated to unauthorized persons.   
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Use of the Center’s data is limited to those individuals who have been selected, approved, 
and trained accordingly.  Access to information contained within the Center will be 
granted only to law enforcement agency personnel who have been screened with a state 
and national fingerprint-based background check, as well as any additional background 
screening processes using procedures and standards established by the Fusion Center 
Governance Board.  Each individual user must complete an Individual User Agreement 
in conjunction with training. 
 
Access to the Center’s databases from outside of the Center will only be allowed over 




It is the intent of the participating agencies to be open with the public concerning data 
collection practices when such openness will not jeopardize ongoing criminal 
investigative activities.  Participating agencies will refer citizens to the original collector 
of the data as the appropriate entity to address any concern about data accuracy and 
quality, when this can be done without compromising an active inquiry or investigation. 
 
All agencies participating in the Center will make this Privacy Policy available for public 
review.  The Center will post this Privacy Policy on its public Web site and make it 
available to any interested party.   
 
VII. Individual Participation 
 
The data maintained by the Center is provided, on a voluntary basis, by the participating 
agencies or is information obtained from other sources by the Center.  Each individual 
user searching against the data as described herein will be required to acknowledge that 
he or she remains solely responsible for the interpretation, further dissemination, and use 
of any information that results from the search process and is responsible for ensuring 
that any information relied upon is accurate, current, valid, and complete, especially 
before any official action is taken in full or partial reliance upon the information 
obtained.   
 
Members of the public cannot access individually identifiable information, on themselves 
or others, from the Center’s applications.  Persons wishing to access data pertaining to 
themselves should communicate directly with the agency or entity that is the source of 
the data in question.   
 
Participating agencies agree that they will refer requests related to privacy or sunshine 





When a query is made to any of the Center’s data applications, the original request is 
automatically logged by the system identifying the user initiating the query.  When such 
information is disseminated outside of the agency from which the original request is 
made, a secondary dissemination log must be maintained in order to correct possible 
erroneous information and for audit purposes, as required by applicable law.  Secondary 
dissemination of information can only be to a law enforcement agency for a law 
enforcement investigative purpose or to other agencies as provided by law.  The agency 
from which the information is requested will maintain a record (log) of any secondary 
dissemination of information.  This record will reflect as a minimum:   
 
1. Date of release. 
2. To whom the information relates.  
3. To whom the information was released (including address and telephone number).  
4. An identification number or other indicator that clearly identifies the data 
released.  
5. The purpose for which the information was requested.   
 
The Governance Board will be responsible for conducting or coordinating audits and 
investigating misuse of the Center’s data or information.  All violations and/or exceptions 
shall be reported to the Board.  Individual users of the Center’s information remain 
responsible for their legal and appropriate use of the information contained therein.  
Failure to abide by the restrictions and use limitations for the use of the Center’s data 
may result in the suspension or termination of use privileges, discipline sanctions 
imposed by the user's employing agency, or criminal prosecution.  Each user and 
participating agency in the Center is required to abide by this Privacy Policy in the use of 
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APPENDIX E. DEFINITIONS FOR PRIVACY POLICY 
DEVELOPMENT 
The following definitions are provided from several sources to provide context 
and continuity for this thesis. 
The following definitions are provided from New Hampshire Revised Statutes 
Annotated (RSA) 91-A:1-a:  
1. Governmental records means any information created, accepted, or 
obtained by, or on behalf of, any public body, or a quorum or majority 
thereof, or any public agency in furtherance of its official function.  
Without limiting the foregoing, the term “governmental records” includes 
any written communication or other information, whether in paper, 
electronic, or other physical form, received by a quorum or majority of a 
public body in furtherance of its official function, whether at a meeting or 
outside a meeting of the body.  The term ‘governmental records’ shall also 
include the term ‘public records.’” (NHRSA, 2008c) 
2. Information means knowledge, opinions, facts, or data of any kind and in 
whatever physical form kept or maintained, including, but not limited to, 
written, aural, visual, electronic, or other physical form. (NHRSA, 2008c). 
3. Public agency means any agency, authority, department, or office of the 
state or of any county, town, municipal corporation, school district, school 
administrative unit, chartered public school, or other political subdivision. 
(NHRSA, 2008c). 
The following definitions are provided from the National Criminal Intelligence 
Sharing Plan: 
1. …the term constitutional rights refers to those rights that an individual 
derives from the Constitution of the United States.  Constitutional rights 
are the strongest protection from improper government conduct against an 
individual.  Unlike other legal rights, constitutional rights cannot be 
changed by a statute.  They   can only be altered by amending the 
Constitution.  (Global, 2003, p. 5) 
2. The term civil liberties refers to fundamental individual rights such as 
freedom of speech, press, or religion; due process of law; and other 
limitations on the power of the government to restrain or dictate the 
actions of individuals.  They are the freedoms that are guaranteed by the 
Bill of Rights—the first ten Amendments—to the Constitution of the 
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United States.  Civil liberties offer protection to individuals from improper 
government action and arbitrary governmental interference in relation to 
the specific freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights.  (Global, 2003, p. 
5) 
3. The term civil rights is used to imply that the state has a role in ensuring 
all citizens have equal protection under the law and equal opportunity to 
exercise the privileges of citizenship regardless of race, religion, sex, or 
other characteristics unrelated to the worth of the individual.  Civil rights 
are, therefore, obligations imposed upon government to promote equality.  
More specifically, they are the rights to personal liberty guaranteed to all 
United States citizens by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and 
by acts of Congress.  Generally, the term civil rights involves positive (or 
affirmative) government action, while the term civil liberties involves 
restrictions on government.  (Global, 2003, pp. 5–6)  
4. The term privacy refers to individuals’ interests in preventing the 
inappropriate collection, use, and release of personally identifiable 
information.  Privacy interests include privacy of personal behavior, 
privacy of personal communications, and privacy of personal data.  The 
U.S. Constitution does not explicitly use the word privacy, but several of 
its provisions protect different aspects of this fundamental right.  Although 
there does not exist an explicit federal constitutional right to an 
individual’s privacy, privacy rights have been articulated in limited 
contexts by the U.S. Supreme Court. (Global, 2003, p. 6) 
5. The protection of individuals’ privacy and constitutional rights is an 
obligation of government officials and is crucial to the long-term success 
of criminal intelligence sharing.  Protecting the privacy and constitutional 
rights of individuals, while at the same time providing for homeland 
security and public safety, will require a commitment from everyone in the 
system—from line officers to top management.  (Global, 2003, p.5) 
The following definitions are provided from New Hampshire House Bill 587:  
1. Criminal intelligence information means information and data that have 
been determined through evaluation to be relevant to the identification of 
actual and impending criminal activity by an individual or group that is 
reasonably suspected of involvement in criminal or terrorist activity, and 
meets valid criminal intelligence suspicion criteria. Criminal activity shall 
not include motor vehicle-related offenses. 
2. Criminal intelligence system means the arrangements, equipment, 
facilities, and procedures used for the receipt, analysis, storage, 
interagency sharing, or dissemination of criminal intelligence information. 
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3. Information and analysis center means an organizational entity within the 
department of safety that compiles, analyzes and disseminates information 
in support of efforts to anticipate, identify, prevent, mitigate, respond to, 
and recover from natural and human-caused threats to the state and its 
people or to the United States, on behalf of the single government agency 
and also operates an inter-jurisdictional intelligence sharing system on 
behalf of 2 or more participating agencies, whether called a criminal 
intelligence system, information and analysis center, fusion center, or by 
any other name. 
4. Intelligence data means information and data gathered from a number of 
sources that, when analyzed and evaluated, provides the basis for decision-
making to help ensure the safety and well-being of the people of New 
Hampshire from actual or impending criminal or terrorist activity. 
5. Inter-jurisdictional intelligence system means an intelligence system that 
involves 2 or more participating agencies representing different 
governmental units or jurisdictions. 
6. Participating agency means an agency of a local, county, state, federal, or 
other governmental unit that exercises homeland security, emergency 
management, law enforcement, or criminal investigation authority and is 
authorized to submit and receive criminal intelligence data through an 
inter-jurisdictional intelligence system. A participating agency may be a 
member or non-member of an inter-jurisdictional intelligence system. 
7. Personally identifiable data means data or information that contains a 
person’s name, date, place of birth, social security number, address, 
employment history, credit history, financial information, account 
numbers, cellular telephone, voice over Internet protocol or landline 
telephone numbers, biometric identifiers including fingerprints, facial 
photographs or images, retinal scans, DNA/RNA, or other identifying data 
unique to that individual. 
8. Reasonably suspected means information received and evaluated by a law 
enforcement officer or intelligence analyst in consideration of his or her 
training and experience and the facts and circumstances under which it 
was received that would cause a prudent person to conclude that there are 
sufficient facts to believe that the information is relevant to and will aid in 
the detection, discovery, or interruption of actual, planned, or impending 
criminal or terrorist activity by an individual or group. 
9. Validation of information means the procedures governing the periodic 
review of criminal intelligence and personally identifiable data to assure 
its continuing compliance with system submission criteria.  (Kurk et al., 
2009) 
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APPENDIX F. DRAFT NEW HAMPSHIRE INFORMATION AND 
ANALYSIS CENTER STRUCTURE 
 
 
Figure 8.   Proposed New Hampshire Information and Analysis Center Structure (From 
Pope, 2009) 
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